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Employment Protection and the Labor Informality
of the Youth: Evidence from India
1
1 Introduction
This paper explores unintended consequences of employment protection laws (EPL), which
limit the ability of employers to fire workers. Nearly every country in the world has some
form of EPL, which can be a requirement of advance notice, a severance payment, a prohi-
bition on firing, or some combination of these (World Bank 2015). One common argument
in favor of these laws is that they reduce income risk in the absence of perfectly functioning
insurance markets (Pissarides 2001).
Although there may be benefits, EPL carries the risk of creating distortions in the labor
market. For example, a worker may respond to increased job security by reducing her
effort level (Ichino and Riphahn 2005). EPL may also introduce more subtle distortions,
including a change in the age composition of the labor force (an “age distortion”). The
central question of this paper is to ask whether EPL generates an age distortion, and if so,
whether there are measurable implications for productivity.
I study these phenomena in India’s manufacturing sector. India is an excellent setting to
study EPL because India’s EPL is among the strictest in the world (World Bank 2008), so
the distortions it creates are large and important for the Indian economy. In addition, there
is considerable variation in state-level EPL, meaning that it is possible to restrict attention
to a single country, ensuring that much of the institutional environment is the same across
the data.
India’s main labor law is the Industrial Disputes Act (IDA), which requires large plants
to obtain government permission before the plants can fire a permanent worker. Contract
workers in all plants and permanent workers in small plants (I discuss the size threshold
below) can be fired freely. I define workers who are permanent workers in large plants as
“formal”; these are the workers who are protected by EPL. One important feature of the
law is that it does not apply to workers who have reached retirement age, which is generally
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58 years old.
There are two reasons why EPL may lead to an older workforce. The first is that a
forward-looking firm is reluctant to hire a young worker if it will not be able to fire her if
she turns out to be unproductive, which I call the apprehension effect. Older workers are
especially “safe” in India, because firms know there is no risk of an unproductive worker
staying on past the retirement age. The second reason that EPL leads to an older workforce
relates to what happens if a firm does hire a worker who turns out to be a poor worker. In
the absence of EPL, the firm can fire the worker and hire someone else. New hires tend to
be young, so this makes the labor force younger. On the other hand, if a firm is disallowed
from firing because of EPL, then the worker will remain with the firm, so the labor force
will be older. I call this the legacy effect.
First I demonstrate a correlation: in states with stronger EPL, older workers are more
likely to be formal. The strength of a state’s EPL is calculated by aggregating the ratings of
three earlier papers.1 To argue that stronger EPL causes older workers to be in the formal
sector, as opposed to the results being driven by an omitted variable or reverse causality,
I consider heterogeneity across manufacturing sectors. The broad strategy is to argue that
some manufacturing sectors are more impacted by EPL than others. If EPL causes the
formal sector to be older, then we should observe more old formal sector workers in sector-
state combinations that have strong EPL and are most affected by EPL. Rajan and Zingales
(1998) use similar reasoning to argue that financial development causes economic growth,
because countries with strong financial systems have especially strong manufacturing sec-
tors in exactly the sectors that rely heavily on external finance.
Which manufacturing sectors in India are most affected by EPL? Sectors where em-
ployers would frequently fire workers if not for EPL are the sectors where EPL matters
the most, but it is not possible to observe directly which sectors would have the most fir-
1They are Besley and Burgess (2004), Bhattacharjea (2008), and OECD (2007).
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ing. The United States is a useful proxy because it has very weak EPL.2 There is a strong
correlation between the rank of involuntary separation rates from one country to another
(Micco and Pagés 2006), which provides some reassurance that the rank of separation rates
is driven by characteristics of the sector rather than by idiosyncratic country-specific fac-
tors.3 Thus, I argue that EPL causes the shift in jobs from young to old because older
workers are especially likely to be formal in strong-EPL states in manufacturing sectors
where the involuntary separation rate in the United States is high.
The next question is whether the shift in jobs from young workers to older workers
has a measurable effect on the total factor productivity (TFP) of large plants. If the age
composition that a plant would choose in the absence of EPL is profit-maximizing, and
EPL causes the plant to employ older workers, then EPL likely reduces plants’ profits, and
its TFP. To examine this question empirically, it is important to first identify which sector-
states are most impacted by EPL. I define the “age shift” as the difference in the average
ages of the formal sector and informal sectors. I interpret a high age shift, meaning an
older formal sector, as evidence that a sector-state is strongly affected by EPL. This could
be because the state has strict EPL, the sector has a high involuntary separation rate, or
because the sector-state has strong enforcement of EPL.
Among plants large enough to be affected by EPL, there is a negative relationship be-
tween TFP and age shift. Smaller plants provide a useful placebo test, and there is no
relationship between TFP and age shift for plants that are too small to be affected by EPL,
which suggests that EPL reduces TFP. There are two suggestive arguments that the age
distortion is one channel through which EPL reduces TFP. First, younger workers have
higher education on average, and EPL does reduce the expected education of formal sector
workers through the age distortion by 0.15 years. If education is a proxy for individual
2I also use the involuntary separation rate in a group of Latin American countries as a robustness check.
3Bassanini et al. (2009) also use the involuntary separation rate of the United States as a proxy for the
separation rate of a manufacturing sector in the absence of EPL.
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productivity, then this is evidence that that EPL reduces TFP through the age distortion.
The magnitude is relatively modest effect, but a state with weak EPL compared to other
Indian states still has very strong EPL, so a change to truly weak EPL may have a larger
effect.
Second, I look at the relationship between EPL and TFP in old and new plants. New
plants have no existing employees, so they are not affected by the legacy effect, but are
affected by the apprehension effect. Older plants, on the other hand, are affected by both.
There is a stronger negative relationship between EPL and TFP in old plants, which is
consistent with the hypothesis that the age distortion is an important channel.
This paper connects two branches of the labor literature. The first is a body of literature
which shows that EPL has negative effects on the employment prospects of the young.4
This literature has been concentrated in wealthy or middle-income countries, and my paper
is the first to find this effect in India. The second strand of literature contends that EPL re-
duces TFP.5 With the exception of Ichino and Riphahn (2005), who show that EPL reduces
TFP by creating moral hazard, these papers do not explore the mechanism. I bridge the
gap between the two branches by arguing that EPL creates an age distortion, and that EPL
reduces TFP by creating the age distortion.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some background in-
formation on the relevant legal institutions of India. Section 3 presents a simple theoretical
model. Section 4 outlines the data, the empirical strategy, and the results, and Section 5
concludes.
4Notable papers in this vein include: Montenegro and Pagés (2004) in Chile, Heckman and Pagés (2001)
in Latin America, Skedinger (1995) in Sweden, Esping-Andersen (2002) and OECD (2004) in Europe.
5See, for example, Bassanini et al. (2009) in OECD, Okudaira et al. (2013) in Japan, Autor et al. (2007)
in the United States, and Dougherty et al. (2013) in India.
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2 Formality and EPL in India
In order to be protected under Chapter VB of the Industrial Disputes Act, a worker must
meet several qualifications, but if a worker is protected, then it is very difficult for her
employer to fire her (Ahsan and Pagés 2007). First, she must be a regular employee, as
opposed to a contract worker, who are hired through outside firms rather than being hired
directly. Contract workers have become more common during the past several decades,
and may be fired by firms without government permission (Chaurey 2015). Employers
cannot dodge EPL without consequence by relying entirely on contract workers, because if
the principal employer exercises direct control over workers employed through an outside
firm, those workers become regular workers and are entitled to the protections of the IDA
(Kumar 2010). The courts can also convert contract workers to regular workers if they do
the same tasks as regular workers.
Second, workers are only protected if they are in a plant that is sufficiently large. The
employment threshold where Chapter VB applies varies by state, because India’s consti-
tution places labor laws on the concurrent list, meaning it is under the purview of both
the central and state governments. Under the central act, plants with 100 workers or more
must receive government permission to fire a regular worker or shut down the plant, but
states can increase or decrease the threshold with permission from the central government.
Uttar Pradesh has modified the threshold to 300, and West Bengal’s threshold is 50. No
state changed this threshold or made any other meaningful changes to the IDA during the
span of my data (1998 - 2009), so my analysis relies on the interaction of time-invariant
strictness of EPL and sector heterogeneity, rather than on intertemporal variation.
Most of the differences between states’ EPL is not related to the IDA’s employment
thresholds. For example, Andhra Pradesh passed an amendment to the IDA in 1987 that
extends the notice that must be given to a worker before the terms of her job can be changed,
6
which is a strengthening of the IDA; see Malik (2007) for more details.
Finally, EPL no longer applies once a worker has reached retirement age. If that age is
not specified in the contract of a manufacturing worker, the default is 58 years old, and in
practice that is almost always the age that applies.
3 Theory
This section will develop a model that illustrates how EPL impacts a firm’s decision be-
tween an old and a young employee, and the implications for productivity. That main
tradeoff is that a firm is willing to hire a slightly less productive older worker in order to
preserve flexibility for the next period.
A firm chooses between a young and old employee in every period, but if it hires a
young employee, it may be constrained by EPL to retain that employee in the following
period. In some manufacturing sectors, the old have comparative advantage relative to the
young. For example, old workers may be more productive than young workers in tasks re-
quiring human capital that is built up over a career, while young workers are more effective
at physical labor. 6EPL is less important in manufacturing sectors where older workers are
more productive, because firms can hire an old worker, employ her until retirement, and
then hire another old worker.7
In order to keep the focus on the choice between old and young, I abstract from a
number of important issues, such as how a firm chooses its number of employees (and
therefore whether or not it crosses the employment threshold to be affected by EPL), how
wages are affected by EPL, and the role of competition in the labor and product markets.
6It is not important whether young or old workers are more productive in a sector in an absolute sense;
what is important is that the difference in productivity between young and old is different across sectors.
7Alternatively, the model could be designed so that sector heterogeneity is based on returns to experience
within a particular firm, or so the preciseness of the signal of the young worker’s ability varied across sectors.
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In practice, large firms employ a mix of regular workers and contract workers. A given
worker is likely to be more productive as a regular worker than a contract worker, because
of the restrictions on the tasks that a contract worker can perform and on the control that
managers can exert on a contract worker. In the interest of simplicity, I focus entirely on
the regular workers for the purpose of the theory.
3.1 Firms
When firm m is created, I assume that its level of labor Lm is exogenously given, and fixed
over time. The focus of this model is the formal sector, meaning that Lm   100, because
EPL does not impact smaller firms. The l-th worker in the firm in period t has productivity
qlt , and the firm’s output in time t is given by the production function:
Out putmt =
Lm
Â
l=1
qlt . (1)
The firm’s only cost is wages, so the firm’s profit in a period is ÂLml=1(qlt  wlt), and its
present discounted profit is
Pro f itm =
•
Â
t=0
b t
Lm
Â
l=1
(qlt wlt) (2)
Firms and workers are both immobile, in the sense that they cannot choose their manu-
facturing sector or their state. The wage-setting process will be described below.
3.2 Labor market and timing
In period 0, a risk-neutral firm is created, and it is matched with one young and one old
worker for each of its Lm positions. I assume that a worker applies for a specific position at
a firm, meaning that if a firm will have Lm employees, it chooses between one young and
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one old applicant for each position.8 The employee works and receives a wage, and the
firm realizes a profit that is difference between the wage and the worker’s productivity.
In period 1, if the firm hired the old worker in period 0, then the worker retires and the
firm is in an identical situation that it was in during period 0. It is again matched with one
young and one old worker, employs one of them, and realizes a profit. If the firm hired
the young worker in period 0, then with probability e, it will be forced to employ her again
in period 1 (high e corresponds to strong EPL). In that case, she will retire after period 1,
and the firm will once again be free to hire either a young or an old worker in period 2. If
the firm is allowed to fire her, then it is free to choose between keeping her and hiring the
young worker, meaning that it is the same position as a firm that hired an old worker in
period 0. This process continues for an infinite number of periods.
3.3 Productivity and information
A young worker has productivity q ⇠U [q ,q + 1], but the realization is not observed by
the firm. The parameter q > 1/2 represents the lowest possible productivity of a young
worker, and is constant across all manufacturing sectors and firms. The firm knows the
distributions of all of the variables, and knows that each draw of q is independent. An
old worker has productivity q ⇠U [q   f ,q +1  f ], where  1/2< f < 1/2 is specific to
the manufacturing sector and exogenous for the firm. The bounds on q and f are chosen
to ensure an interior solution, and to guarantee positive productivities. A high value of f
means that young workers in the sector are relatively productive, so firing is frequent, while
a low value of f means that employers rarely want to fire workers.
I assume the firm observes the old worker’s productivity perfectly, because the old
employee has a verifiable track record.9
8If a firm could observe Lm young and Lm old workers and choose the best Lm workers, there would be
economies of scale in the matching process.
9This assumption could easily be relaxed, since the firm is risk-neutral and the old worker will retire after
9
3.4 Wages
To describe how a worker’s wage is determined, it is important to first describe her outside
option. There are many more workers who want formal sector jobs than there are available
positions, so I assume that a worker who passes up an opportunity at a formal job ends up
in the informal sector. A worker with productivity q in the formal sector has productivity
of aq in the informal sector, where 0  a < 1 is constant across workers, manufacturing
sectors, and states. The informal sector is competitive, with no search frictions, and a
worker can earn her expected productivity. The information structure and timing in the
informal sector is the same as in the formal sector. A young worker’s expected productivity
in the formal sector is q +1/2, so her outside option is to work in the informal sector for a
wage of a(q +1/2). Firms can observe an old worker’s productivity in the formal sector,
q , so firms also know that her productivity in the informal sector is aq .10
I assume that when a firm retains an employee, whether because it chooses to or because
it has been forced to be EPL, the firm makes a new wage offer. This new wage takes
into account the worker’s productivity, which has now been revealed. EPL does place
restrictions on pay reductions,11 but in the interest of simplicity, I assume that EPL prevents
firing, but does not impact wage setting.
When the formal sector firm has chosen which worker to hire, it has all of the bargaining
power, and it makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the worker. If it chooses the young worker,
it offers a wage of a(q + 1/2), and if it chooses the old worker, it offers aq . Hiring the
young worker gives the firm an expected profit of (1 a)(q + 1/2), while hiring the old
the next period; the model is essentially unchanged if the old worker’s expected productivity is distributed
q ⇠U [q   f ,q +1  f ] instead of her actual productivity.
10Human capital is assumed to not be firm-specific, but the results would be the same if human capital
were entirely firm specific and the outside option of all workers was some wage w, where w<q .
11If it did not, then EPL would never have any bite, as an employer could retain an employee at a wage of
zero.
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worker gives the firm a profit of (1 a)q . The firm’s present discounted profit is
Pro f itm = (1 a)
•
Â
t=0
b t
Lm
Â
l=1
qlt (3)
3.5 A firm’s decision
Each position is independent of the others, so the firm’s problem is to maximize the profits
from a single position within the firm. The profit for position l in firm m is,
Pro f itml = (1 a)
•
Â
t=0
b tqlt (4)
The only decision the firm makes is whether to hire the young worker or the old worker.
Every period in which the firm has a choice between the workers is identical, so without
loss of generality we can say the firm chooses a threshold z  f + q , where it hires an
old worker if the old worker has productivity of at least z  f + q . In periods when it
has the choice of employees, the firm chooses the young worker with probability z (it is
more convenient to think of the firm as choosing the probability z rather than the threshold
z  f +q ).12
The reason that a firm may hire an old worker with productivity below q+1/2 is to pre-
serve flexibility for the next period. If the old worker has productivity just below q +1/2,
then hiring the young worker does maximize expected productivity in the current period,
but the firm risks being committed to a low-productivity employee in the next period.
I define the firm’s present discounted profit (starting when the firm is not committed
to a worker) as a function of z as V (z). If the firm hires the young worker in period
0, her expected productivity is q + 1/2 in period 0. With probability e, it must retain
the employee, meaning the expected productivity is (q + 1/2  f ) in period 1, and then
12For example, if q = 3, f = .1, and z = .4, then the old worker’s productivity is distributed U [2.9,3.9],
and the firm hires an old worker whose productivity is at least 3.3.
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the worker retires and the firm is uncommitted in period 2, so it receives V (z) as a con-
tinuation value, starting in period 2. If it is allowed to fire her in period 1 (which oc-
curs with probability 1  e), then it has continuation value of V (z) starting in period 1.
Therefore, the discounted sum of expected productivities when hiring the young worker is
(q +1/2+ e[b (q +1/2  f )+b 2V (z)]+(1  e)bV (z)).
If the firm hires the old worker, her productivity is distributed U [z  f +q ,1  f +q ],
so her expected productivity is q +((z  f )+ (1  f ))/2 = q +(z+ 1)/2  f . The firm
then earns continuation value of V (z) starting in period 1. We know that the firm is free to
hire either worker in period 0, so the probability of hiring the young worker in period 0 is
z.
The firm’s profit as a function of z is
V (z) =z(q +1/2+ e[b (q +1/2  f )+b 2V (z)]+(1  e)bV (z))+
(1  z)[(z+1)/2  f +q +bV (z)]
(5)
Solving for V (z)
V (z) = ( 1+2 f   z 2 f z+ z2 ezb +2e f zb )/(2( 1+b )(1+ezb ))+q/(1+b ), (6)
and maximizing over z yields the optimal choice of z:
z⇤ =
8>><>>:
p
be+2be f+1 1
be e> 0
1/2+ f e= 0
(7)
Note the numerator and denominator are both zero of the top expression are equal to 0
when e= 0, and it can be verified via l’Hôpital’s rule that this expression is smooth at e= 0.
To gain some intuition behind this expression, consider the special case where e = f = 0.
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Old and young workers are equally productive, and the firm is free to fire any worker, so
the firm will just choose whichever worker has the higher productivity in every period, so
the probability of hiring the young worker, z⇤, is equal to 1/2. Equation (7) indicates that
z⇤ = 1/2+ f = 1/2, as expected.
3.6 Individual-level outcomes
The first question is how the likelihood of a young person being hired varies as EPL varies
in strictness. For a young person to be hired, the firm needs to be free to choose and then
actually choose the young. Based on equation (5), for every period in which the firm is free
to choose, it will be committed to the old worker in ez⇤ periods, meaning that it is free in
a fraction 1/(1+ ez⇤) of the periods and committed in ez⇤/(1+ ez⇤) of the periods. Since
it chooses the young worker with probability z⇤ when it has a choice, it will hire a young
person with probability z⇤/(1+ ez⇤). The effect of strengthening EPL on the likelihood
that a young person is hired,13 is:
∂
∂e
z⇤
1+ ez⇤
< 0 (8)
See Appendix 1 for proof. In words, increasing EPL reduces the chance of a young
person being hired, because with strong EPL a firm is less likely to be allowed to fire an old
employee, and even when it is free to choose, it is reluctant to hire a young person because
it knows it is unlikely to be allowed to fire.
Prediction 1: Fewer young workers work in the formal sector in states with strict EPL.
Next, I examine whether EPL has a stronger impact in those sectors where firms would
like to fire more often. First, I verify that in a zero-EPL environment, the firing rate is
increasing in f . If e= 0, then a firm chooses the young worker when the old worker’s pro-
13Note that z⇤ is itself a function of e.
13
ductivity is below q+1/2, which happens with probability 1/2+ f . A worker is fired when
the young worker is hired in two consecutive periods, so a worker is fired with probability
(1/2+ f )2, which is increasing in f , the relative productivity of younger workers.
To test whether EPL has a stronger effect in sectors where firing is more attractive, I
look at how the likelihood of hiring a young worker changes with a change in e and f :
∂
∂e∂ f
z⇤
1+ ez⇤
< 0 (9)
See Appendix 1 for proof.
Prediction 2: EPL depresses a young worker’s chance of being in the formal sector
more strongly in manufacturing sectors where firms would like to fire workers.
3.7 Firm-level outcomes
The first two predictions will be tested using individual-level data, and there is an analogous
prediction on the firm level. Firm profitability is a function of parameters e, f , and b and
the choice variable z. I define f(e, f ,b ) as the profits associated with the optimal choice of
z. We can verify that firm profitability is decreasing in EPL, and especially in high-firing
sectors:
∂
∂e
f(e, f ,b )< 0
and
∂ 2
∂e∂ f
f(e, f ,b )< 0
See Appendix 1 for proof. The more profitable firms also have higher productivity per
period, which generates the following prediction.
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Prediction 3: EPL reduces a firm’s productivity, especially in high-firing sectors.
Finally, a new firm and an older firm are impacted differently by EPL. More specifically,
a new firm has no existing employees, so it is not impacted by the legacy effect, while an
older firm may have a low-productivity employee that it cannot fire. The hiring decisions
of both firms are distorted by the possibility that a worker must be retained, so both firms
experience the apprehension effect.
A firm which is committed to a worker has expected productivity of 1/2  q+q . A
firm which is not has expected productivity of (z+ 1)/2  q+ q , and since z > 0, the
uncommitted plant has a higher expected productivity.
Prediction 4: EPL reduces the productivity of older plants more than new plants.
4 Empirics
The model generates four predictions to be tested. Below, I will explain the data sources
used, the strategy that I will use to test the predictions, and the results. Finally, I will present
some alternate explanations for my results.
4.1 Data
The individual-level data is from the National Sample Survey (NSS) on Employment and
Unemployment, which reports a manufacturing worker’s age, regular or contract status, the
size of the establishment she works in, as well as education, and sex. To classify the level of
EPL in each state, I rely on three papers, Besley and Buress (2004), Bhattacharhea (2008),
and OECD (2007). The Annual Survey of Industries provides plant-level data necessary
to compute total factor productivity (TFP). Finally, the U.S. Displaced Worker Survey and
Micco and Pagés (2006) provide measures of the job loss rate in the United States and Latin
America, which serves as a proxy for the firing rate in India.
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4.1.1 National Sample Survey
The National Sample Survey is carried out by the central government of India, and is a
nationally representative survey covering a wide variety of topics. Questions regarding
employment are not asked every year, and there have been only two rounds of the survey
that ask the respondent how many people work in her place of business. This question is
critical for my definition of formality, so I only use data from those years, 2009-2010 and
2011-2012. I pool the data and use year fixed effects to capture firm-invariant year effects.
The 2009-2010 round uses the 2004 version of India’s National Industrial Classification
(NIC-2004), while the latter round uses NIC-2008. Details on the concordance are available
upon request.
There is evidence of age heaping in the sample; for example, there are over five times
as many self-reported 40-year olds as 41-year olds. To circumvent this issue, I treat all
workers between 38 and 42 years old as 40, all workers between 43 and 47 as 45, and so
on. Workers whose contracts do not specify otherwise may be fired after age 58, and there
is indeed a large decline in formality from the 53 to 57 age category to the 58 to 62 age
category. The forces acting on those workers older than 58 are likely different from those
acting on younger workers, so I exclude everyone who is 58 and above. Similarly, I exclude
everyone who is under 18 because of child labor laws that affect younger workers.
The definition of “formal” varies somewhat depending on the author and the context.
I am most interested in which workers are protected by EPL, meaning they must be a
regular worker and not a contract worker, and in a plant with at least 100 workers (this
threshold is 50 in West Bengal and 300 in Uttar Pradesh). The NSS asks about the size
of the establishment where a worker is employed as a categorical response question, and
the workers in the NSS are not matched to the plants in the Annual Survey of Industries
dataset described below. The highest category provided is 20 or more workers, so I have
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a noisy measure of whether a worker is in a plant that is truly protected by EPL. I define
a worker as formal if she is a regular worker in a plant with at least 20 workers, which is
overcounting somewhat.
4.1.2 State-level EPL
In order to classify the strictness of EPL in each of 15 major states, I follow the approach of
Gupta et al. (2009; GHK hereafter), who analyze three earlier studies that classify states.
The first paper in the group is by Besley and Burgess (2004), and classifies states according
to the text of amendments to the IDA that were passed by the state. They classify each
amendment passed by a state in year t as pro-worker or pro-employer, and if a majority of
amendments in t is pro-worker or pro-employer, then they classify the state as moving in
pro-worker or pro-employer direction in year t. A state’s level of EPL in year T is defined
as the sum of all of the changes in year 1, ...,T , where the change in every year is limited
to be  1,0, or 1.
The second paper is by Bhattacharjea (2008), who argues that Besley and Burgess code
some amendments incorrectly, and that the way they aggregate amendments is arbitrary.
For example, if one state passes two pro-worker amendments in the same year and another
passes the same two amendments in different years, then the first state has an EPL of
+1 while the second has an EPL of +2. Bhattacharjea presents his own classification of
each amendment to the IDA, and also includes judicial rulings that impact how the IDA is
applied.
OECD (2007) uses a survey to identify a range of state-level labor reforms, breaking
away from the other two studies in terms of methodology. This study encompasses the
IDA, as well as the Factories Act and the Contract Labour Act. The authors consider both
the statutory laws and the enforcement mechanisms that are in place.
GHK convert each study’s rating of each state into a simple strong, weak, or neutral
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EPL (-1, +1, 0), so that there are three ratings for each state, and I use the same three
ratings for each state. The only way that our methods diverge is how to collapse from
three ratings per state to one. Where there are disagreements between ratings, GHK use a
majority rules approach, meaning that every state has a score of -1, +1, or 0. One downside
to this approach is that it is discards information. For example, all three papers agree that
Maharashtra has strong EPL, while only two of the three code Orissa as having strong
EPL, but GHK regard them as having the same level of EPL. The minor change that I make
to GHK’s method is to preserve that information and add the three ratings to arrive at an
overall ranking between -3 and 3. In the main specification I treat this as an interval scale,
and in a robustness check I consider EPL as a categorical variable.
To see the ranking of each state, please see Appendix Table 1.
4.1.3 Firing rate
My identification strategy depends on an assumption about which manufacturing sectors in
India would have a high rate of firing in the absence of EPL. The first proxy that I consider is
involuntary job loss rate in the United States, which I calculate based on the U.S. Displaced
Worker Survey (DWS). I pool data from 2004, 2006, 2008, and 2010 (the DWS is published
every other year). Bassanini et al. (2009) use the same method to calculate a measure of
involuntary separation rates in the United States.
The ideal measure would specifically refer to firing, but the DWS includes firing as part
of “other,” so firing is not directly observable. Job losses that are categorized in the DWS
as something other than firing may also be informative about what the firing rate in India
would be. For example, if a worker in the United States loses her job and the reason given
is “Position abolished,” it is possible that a more junior position was created to fill a similar
role. The involuntary job loss rate in the DWS is not a perfect proxy for the firing rate in
India, but as long as the discrepency between the two is uncorrelated with the independent
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variables of interest, the empirical strategy is unaffected.
The DWS provides data on 16 2-digit manufacturing sectors. The only manufacturing
sector that is included in the NSS but not the DWS is tobacco, so I drop tobacco throughout
the paper. This leaves 20 2-digit manufacturing sectors in the NSS, classified according to
the NIC-2004, and I match manufacturing sectors. Where a DWS sector encompasses two
NSS sectors, I apply the DWS firing rate to both NSS sectors. Please see Appendix Table
2 for more details.
Using US separation rates as a proxy for which manufacturing sectors are most af-
fected by EPL is an established strategy in the literature, but one natural concern is whether
conditions in the United States are informative about India. While Latin America is still
considerably wealthier than India, it may provide some reassurance if results are similar us-
ing data from Latin American countries. Following Davis and Haltiwanger (1999), Micco
and Pagés (2006) define job reallocation as the sum of job creation and job destruction.
They calculate job reallocation for eight14 manufacturing sectors for 18 countries, across
the Americas and Europe. This measure is not the same as firing, but it is similar, because
industries with frequent firing will also have high rates of job destruction.
In order to construct a Latin American measure of firing for each of eight sectors, I take
the average job reallocation rate for the seven Latin American countries with no missing
data: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Micco and
Pagés also present the correlation in ranks of the job reallocation rate to assess the similar-
ity between different countries, and find that the correlation is quite high. Colombia is the
poorest country of the group and therefore the closest in GDP per capita to India, so the
correlation in the rank of job reallocation rates between Colombia and other countries is
instructive. With the exception of Sweden, the Spearman rank correlation between Colom-
14Again, when matching sectors, I apply the firing rate of a broad category to its components. For example,
Micco and Pagés present data on paper, printing, and publishing, and I assume that it applies to both sector
21 (paper and paper products) and sector 22 (publishing, printing, and recorded media) in NIC-2004.
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bia job reallocation rates and those of each of the 16 other countries is at least 0.3, which
is significantly different from 0 at the one percent level.15 This finding provides some re-
assurance that the rank of India’s firing rates in the absence of EPL would be similar to the
job loss measures in the United States and Latin America.
4.1.4 Plant-level data
The main data source to calculate TFP is the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI), from 1998-
1999 to 2007-08. The ASI’s sampling sector includes all plants that employ at least 20
workers without power, and at least 10 workers with power, and these plants are surveyed
every several years. The census sector consists of the larger factories, but the threshold has
varied between 50 and 200 over the course of the sample, meaning that factories with at
least 200 have been surveyed every year. For more information regarding data issues within
the ASI and the sampling procedure, see Bollard et al. (2013) and Harrison et al. (2011).
I use the Levinsohn-Petrin (2003) method to calculate TFP, which is an improvement
on using OLS to calculate total factor productivity. It is similar in that it defines as total
factor productivity the residual from a Cobb-Douglas regression. It has the advantage that
it corrects for the endogeneity generated by the fact that plants can increase their labor
in response to a positive productivity shock by using a plant’s intermediate inputs as an
instrument for the unobserved productivity shock.
To calculate TFP, I need data on output, labor, capital, fuel, and electricity. After drop-
ping all plant-year observations with missing or negative values, I am left with 227,601
observations and 94,037 unique plants. The ASI provides sampling weights for all plants,
which again I use throughout.
The ASI lists values in current rupees, so to adjust for inflation I apply industry-specific
15Sweden is the only country whose job reallocation ranks are not correlated with the others. Micco and
Pagés discuss possible reasons why Sweden is an outlier in this regard but do not reach any conclusions.
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deflators to value added using the Wholesale Price Index (WPI). I deflate intermediate
inputs according to the WPI associated with that product’s five-digit ASICC code. Some
inputs do not have an ASICC code listed; for example, capital is deflated using the WPI
for machinery and equipment. Dougherty et al. (2011) give a detailed description of the
deflating process, and I follow their method.
4.2 Empirical strategy
The first section of the empirics uses individual-level outcomes from the NSS to argue
that EPL shifts jobs from young to old workers. In the second section, I calculate how
strongly EPL impacts a sector-state using individual-level outcomes, and then examine the
relationship between plant-level TFP and the importance of EPL in a sector-state.
4.2.1 Individual-level outcomes
The first question is whether older workers are relatively more likely to be in the formal
sector in states with stricter EPL (Prediction 1 in the theory). To test this relationship,
leaving aside for now the question of causality, I consider regressions of the form
Formali jk = f (agei jkt ,EPLk,d jk,dt ,xi), (10)
where i indexes individuals, j indexes manufacturing sectors, k indexes states, and t indexes
years (there are two years of data). d jk is a dummy variable that the worker is in sector j
and state k, and xi is a vector of characteristics of worker i. The dependent variable is equal
to 1 if the worker is a regular employee in a plant that employs at least 20 people.
In the main specification, I use a linear probability model of the form
Formali jk = b1agei jk+b2EPLk+b3agei jk ⇤EPLk+d jk+dt +xi+ ei jk, (11)
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where xi includes dummy variables for every level of education and for gender. I conclude
that the evidence is consistent with Prediction 1 if b3, the coefficient on the interaction
term, is positive.
Note that I estimate how EPL shifts jobs from young to old (or vice versa), but I do
not estimate whether EPL creates or destroys formal sector jobs. The reason for this is that
there is no time variation in EPLk in my data, and there is a long list of state-level variables
other than EPL that could impact the level of formality. I use sector-state fixed effects,
which capture any variable that affects the formality of everyone equally in a sector-state
(and therefore in a sector or in a state, as well). The variable EPLk is absorbed by the fixed
effects, and is listed above only for clarity.
Shifting jobs from young to old may have important implications for the education
of the workforce. Young workers are disproportionately high education, so the impact of
shifting jobs from young to old also decreases the average education of the workforce.
This model imposes a linear structure on EPL, meaning that the change from EPL= 2
(strict EPL in two indices and neutral in one) to EPL =  1 (strict EPL in one index and
neutral in two) has the same impact as the change from EPL = 1 to EPL = 2, a topic that
will be addressed in more detail in the sensitivity analysis section.
I follow the common practice of estimating both types of models so that results do not
depend solely on either approach, and results are similar in all cases.
I report standard errors that are clustered at the state level to address the possibility of
correlated errors within a state and because the variation in EPL occurs at the state level
and I have many observations per state (Bertrand et al., 2004). In an additional robustness
check, I use the Donald and Lang (2007) estimator.
Some of the potential endogeneity problems can be solved by considering sector het-
erogeneity, where some manufacturing sectors are more impacted by EPL than others. I
rely on the approach of Rajan and Zingales (1998), who test whether financial development
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causes economic growth by showing that countries with strong financial systems have es-
pecially strong manufacturing sectors in exactly the sectors that rely heavily on external
finance (measured as those sectors where American firms use more external finance).
I make a similar argument: if EPL causes the shift in formal jobs from young to old
workers, we should see that differences in EPL generate larger formality boosts to old
workers in manufacturing sectors in which Indian employers would like to fire workers.
The United States has some of the weakest EPL in the world, so it serves as a useful
benchmark for what would happen in the absence of EPL. I use measures of job losses
in the United States and Latin America as proxies for the firing rate in India. Bassanini
et al. (2009) uses the same variation to identify the causal effect of EPL in Europe, and
Dougherty et al. (2013) employ the same strategy in India.
I test prediction 2 with the following regression:
Formali jk =b1agei jk+b2EPLk+d jk+dt +xi
b3 ⇤agei jk ⇤ f ire j+
b4 ⇤agei jk ⇤EPLk+
b5 ⇤ f ire j ⇤EPLk+
b6 ⇤agei jk ⇤EPLk ⇤ f ire j
(12)
and conclude there is evidence that EPL causes the different age composition if b6 > 0
(note that EPLk is absorbed by the sector-state fixed effects, and is listed above only for
clarity).
4.2.2 Plant-level outcomes
In the first part of the empirical section, I argue that EPL distorts who is employed in the
formal sector. In the second part of the paper, I will provide evidence that suggests that this
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distortion reduces productivity at the plant level.
The two main datasets (NSS and ASI) are not matched, meaning I do not observe the
place of employment of a respondent to the NSS or the age profile of a plant in the ASI.
I use the previous results to classify sector-states by how strongly plants within them are
affected by EPL.
The first option would be to use the same strategy as above and classify the impact of
EPL on a sector-state by the interaction of state-level EPL and sector-level firing rate. The
direct effects of EPL and firing rate will be captured by state and sector fixed effects, which
are important because of the large number of variables that are constant across the state
or sector that may influence TFP. One weakness of using the interaction is that there is no
variation that is truly at the sector-state level. For example, if enforcement is stronger in
some sector-states than others, this will not be captured.
Instead, I infer the impactfulness of EPL by observing the distribution of ages in the
formal and informal sectors in the sector-state. If the formal sector is relatively old, then
I conclude that EPL is important, whether because of strict EPL in a high-firing sector, or
because of particularly high enforcement.
I define the “age shift” as the difference in average age of the formal and informal
sectors in the sector-state. This is based on NSS rather than ASI data, so age shift is a
sector-state variable rather than a plant or firm variable.
age shift jk ⌘mean age of formal sector jk  mean age of informal sector jk (13)
The line of causation is that EPL causes a decrease in TFP, but I do not directly observe
EPL at the sector-state level, because enforcement is difficult to measure. EPL also causes
the age shift, which I can measure, and stronger enforcement will generate a larger age
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shift.16 I look at the relationship between age shift and TFP, but I do not attribute any causal
relationship between age shift and TFP; instead, age shift and TFP are both impacted by
EPL. Throughout the section on plant-level outcomes, a central identifying assumption is
that high age shift sector are more impacted by EPL.
First, I will test whether factories in sector-states with high age shift have a lower TFP,
which I will take as evidence that indication that EPL does reduce TFP. Plants with fewer
than 100 workers provide a useful placebo test, since the main employment laws do not
apply to them. To control for the possibility that there is an unobserved sector- or state-
level variable that influences TFP, I use sector and state fixed effects, and cluster at the
state level. Breaking the sample into plants with more and fewer than 100 workers (and
excluding West Bengal and Uttar Pradesh because they have a different threshold for the
IDA), I test prediction 3 using this regression:
TFPi jkt = b1 ⇤ageshi f t jk+d j+dk+dt + e jk, (14)
where i indexes plants, j indexes states, k indexes manufacturing sectors, t indexes years.
I conclude that EPL harms TFP if b1 < 0 for factories with more than 100 workers and is
near zero for factories with fewer.
One possible concern is that larger plants are more productive, and some unobserved
variable that is correlated with age shift causes plants to be larger. I control for the log of a
plant’s labor to address the possibility of economies of scale, and present results above and
below 100 workers, with and without the control.
Using individual-level data allows me to conclude that EPL causes a distortion in who
is employed in the formal sector. It is natural to think that this creates some negative
impact on TFP, and in this portion of the paper I provide evidence that is consistent with
16In terms of the theory, more enforcement can be considered an increase in e, which leads to older formal
sector workers.
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this hypothesis.
There are two broad classes of mechanisms through which EPL reduces productivity.
The first group is the mechanisms that do not vary in strength over a plant’s lifetime, and
the second group is the mechanisms that impact new and old plants differently.
By comparing new and old plants, all with at least 100 workers, I can test whether
there is some mechanism operating whose strength varies over the life of a plant. Finding
evidence that such a mechanism does impact TFP is consistent with the hypothesis that
the distortion of who is employed has an effect on TFP. The overall strategy is to split the
sample in new and old plants with at least 100 workers, and estimate the same regression
above:
TFPi jkt = b1 ⇤ageshi f t jk+d j+dk+dt , (15)
If the legacy and apprehension effects are both important for TFP, then I expect to see
a negative relationship between TFP and age shift for both sets of plants, but a stronger
negative relationship for the old plants.
The ASI includes data on a plant’s first year of operation, so it is possible to calculate
how long a plant has operated, but that leaves open the question of how to define “new” and
“old.” In the body of the paper, I will split the observations equally into new and old, which
means that new plants are defined to be 17 years old or less. To show that the results are
not dependent on the threshold chosen, in a robustness check I present the same regression
with a wide variety of other thresholds.
4.3 Results
In Table 1 (tables are at the end of this document), I present the results from the regression
of equation (11). The linear probability model is column 1, and the probit is in column 2.
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The coefficient on the variable of interest, the interaction between EPL and age, is positive
and significant at the five percent level in both models, and this result is consistent with
Prediction 1, which states that more old workers in the formal sector in states with strict
EPL.
To give a sense of the magnitude of of an interaction effect, consider the difference in
the predicted probability of formality for old and young workers depending on EPL, based
on column 1 of Table 1. In the states with the weakest EPL, I predict that a 20-year old
worker has a 5.9 percentage point higher probability of formality than a 55-year old, while
in a state with the strongest EPL, I predict the 20-year old has an 8.5 percentage point lower
chance of formality. Approximately 21 percent of both 20-year olds and 55-year olds are
formal across the entire sample, meaning that the effect is substantial, but plausible.
In addition, based on each worker’s predicted chance of formality with different levels
of EPL, I can calculate the expected level of education in the formal sector at every level
of EPL. I predict that moving from the strongest EPL of any state to the weakest would
increase the average years of school in the formal sector by approximately 0.15 years. If
education is a reasonable proxy for productivity, then this is evidence that EPL reduces TFP
by distorting who has a job. The effect is driven by the fact that EPL increases the average
age of the formal sector workforce, and younger workers in India on average have more
education. It is true that these younger workers have less experience, but the fact that plants
who are relatively unimpacted by EPL choose younger workers suggests that education is
in fact important.
An increase of schooling by 0.15 years may appear to be a relatively modest effect in
terms of magnitude, but the state with the weakest EPL still has very strong restrictions on
firing relative to other countries. Even in relatively pro-employer Uttar Pradesh, govern-
ment permission is still required to fire a worker in a plant with over 300 workers. If a state
in India relaxed EPL to the level of the United States or even to Western Europe, it is likely
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that the gains in education would be significantly larger.
Next, I test prediction 2, which is that the relationship in Table 1 is especially strong
in those manufacturing sectors where employers would like to fire workers. A positive
coefficient on Age x EPL x Firing suggests that prediction 2 is true. One way to think of
this is that an older worker in a high-firing sector in a strict-EPL state is more likely to have
a job in the formal sector than an older worker in a high-firing sector in a lax-EPL state,
because this is exactly the type of employee who is most helped by EPL.
In columns 1 and 2, I test this relationship using the US firing rate, with linear and probit
models, and results for both are positive and significant. With the Latin American firing
rate, about 10 percent of the observations are missing because of a lack of firing rate data
in some manufacturing sectors. The linear model, in column 3, is positive and significant,
although at the 10 percent level, while the probit results are positive and significant at the
one percent level.
Moving to the plant-level data, I estimate Equation (14) to test whether plants in sector-
states that are most affected by EPL, as measured by the age shift in the sector-state, have
a lower productivity (prediction 3). I find there is a negative and significant relationship
for the plants with at least 100 workers (column 1), but no relationship for smaller plants
(column 2), which is consistent with the hypothesis that EPL reduces TFP. The fact that
there is no relationship between age shift and TFP for small plants provides some assurance
that there is not some other variable that is invariant within each sector-state that is driving
the results. I do find a positive and strongly significant coefficient on log of labor, which
indicates that large plants tend to be more productive, but including that variable does not
cause a major change to the coefficient on age shift.
In order to discuss the magnitude of this relationship, the first step is to estimate how
much a change in EPL impacts the age shift. I compute expected chance of formality based
on column 1 of Table 1. If all of India moved from the lowest level of EPL in the sample
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to the highest level, then I estimate the age shift would increase by 2.6 years.
Based on column 1 of Table 3, we can conclude that moving from the weakest to the
strongest EPL causes an increase in the age shift by 2.6, and also causes a decrease in the
TFP variable of .021 (2.6 x 7.9 / 1000). Because TFP is measured as the log of productivity,
this corresponds to approximately 2.1 percentage points.
Finally, I estimate Equation (14) again, but splitting the sample in a different way to
separate mechanisms that do not vary over the lifetime of a plant (such as the apprehension
effect) and those that do (such as the legacy effects). I focus exclusively on the plants with
at least 100 workers, and divide the sample into new and old plants. In Table 4, I define
“old” plants as 17 years. For plants over 17 years, I find a significant negative coefficient on
age shift with and without including log labor as a control. For plants under 17 years old,
the coefficient on age shift is also negative, but it is not significant. An F-test reveals that the
difference between the two coefficients is significant, at the 5% level without controlling
for log labor, and at the 1% level when controlling for log labor.17
The fact that old plants are more affected by EPL than young plants is consistent with
the hypothesis that the legacy effect is important for TFP. The coefficient is negative in
all cases, which is what we would expect if the apprehension effect is important for TFP.
However, the relationship is not statistically significant. This may reflect the fact that age
shift is a noisy measure of EPL.
4.4 Alternative explanations
In this section I discuss some alternate explanations that could also generate the results
presented above, and in some cases I present empirical analysis to test their importance.
17The comparison of the coefficients is performed by regressing TFP on age shift, fixed effects for year,
sector, and state, where the coefficients on all variables are allowed to be different for new and old plants.
Then I test for equality of the coefficient on age shift with new and old plants using an F-test.
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4.4.1 Individual-level results
One way that the regression in Equation (12) could generate a spurious non-zero result is if
some characteristic of sector-states leads to the passage of stricter EPL. For example, sup-
pose that one state has old workers and strong unions in high-firing sectors, while another
has old workers and strong unions in low-firing sectors. Unions in the former would have
a stronger incentive to spend resources lobbying for stricter EPL, and if successful, then I
would estimate a positive coefficient on agei jk ⇤EPLk ⇤ f ire j even if EPL did not cause the
change in the age of the workforce. However, consider the identical scenario, but this time
the workers are young instead of old. Unions in the high-firing sector would still lobby for
stricter EPL, and now I would estimate a negative coefficient on agei jk ⇤EPLk ⇤ f ire j. The
issue is that strong unions will push for strict EPL whether their members are mostly old
or mostly young, because there is value in helping any union member keep her job.
To generate a positive correlation without a causal relationship, we need to assume that
union lobby more when their members were older. But if the main goal of the union is to
protect its older members and they are able to influence legislation, it is surprising that the
changes to EPL that are passed are provisions like making strikes easier or increasing the
penalties for unauthorized firing, which apply broadly to all workers. The more logical step
to help specifically older workers would be raise the retirement age, but this has not been
done.
A related question is how characteristics of a state influence the types of legislation
they pass. For example, those states with an older workforce may have been more likely to
pass stricter EPL when those laws were being passed (primarily in the 1970’s and 1980’s).
To the extent that these state-level characteristics are persistent, this phenomenon could
generate a correlation between older formal sector workers and stronger EPL, even if the
latter does not cause the former.
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I can test whether this is a significant concern, albeit indirectly. The main question is
whether “sunset industries,” those which are declining over time, are substantively different
from industries that are growing over time. The concern would be that states wtih a larger
share of sunset industries would be more inclined to protect older workers. I define a
sector’s growth over time is defined as the percentage growth in employment between 1999
and 2008, and a state’s exposure to sunset industries is the average growth of the sectors
they produce, weighted by the labor force in 1999. Table 5 presents the same regression
as those in column 1 of Table 1, but the sample is split into states whose production is
mostly in slow-growing sectors (column 1), mostly in fast-growing sectors (column 2), and
all sectors (column 3). The coefficients on the variable of interest, Age x EPL, is somewhat
larger for the states focusing on fast-growing sectors, but this suggests that age leads to
formal sector employment more strongly in the fast-growth states, which is the opposite
direction from what one would expect if the states heavy in sunset industries are more
likely to protect older workers. Table 6 presents analagous results for the regression in
column 1 of Table 2. Here the coefficient on Age x EPL x Firing is nearly identical in the
two subsamples, which provides some confidence that the results are not being driven by a
state’s composition of slow- and fast-growing industries.
4.4.2 Plant-level results
Next, consider problems of selection when estimating Equation (14) for plants above and
below 100 workers. The concern is that plants’ decision to cross the 100-worker threshold
is itself impacted by EPL. The most natural version of this story is that in strict-EPL states,
only the most productive plants are willing to become large enough to face EPL, but that
would lead to a positive relationship between TFP and age shift in large plants, rather than
the negative relationship that I find. That said, one way to address the selection issue is to
consider plants who are further from the threshold, because a plant far above or far below
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100 workers would likely be on the same side of 100 even if EPL were weaker or stronger.
I estimate this regression again in Table 8 using thresholds of 50 and 200 workers, and find
similar results.
My explanation for the results in Table 4 is that new and old firms are impacted dif-
ferently by EPL because they are new or old, but there is another possible interpretation.
Chapter VB, the most important form of EPL, was passed in 1976, and applied to all of
India. A firm entering the market in, say, 1970 may not have anticipated the legal changes,
while a firm entering in 1990 could easily observe it. If firms know a priori whether they
will be more or less affected by EPL, then we would expect that in 1970 only the less im-
pacted firms would enter the market, which would generate the observed results that older
firms are more affected by EPL. In order to test whether this is an important concern, I re-
produce Table 4, but among old firms, I include only those formed after 1976. The results,
which are presented in Table 7, are substantively the same.
The results in Table 3 and 4 are consistent with the hypothesis that the distortion in who
has a job is important for TFP. They also provide evidence against an alternative hypothesis:
that the entire mechanism through which EPL reduces TFP is that EPL reduces worker
effort and does not impact who has a job. This hypothesis is not consistent with the results
in Tables 3 and 4 because it would imply that new and old plants should be equally affected
by EPL.
There is at least one other hypothesis that is consistent with the results on new and old
plants. EPL prevents plants from responding quickly to changes in demand. For example,
suppose a new plant chooses an employment level that is appropriate for the time when it
is created. As the optimal level of employment changes over time, the plant cannot adjust
downward if EPL is strong, and may have too many workers. Older plants would then be
more affected by EPL than newer plants, which is consistent with my findings. It is the
subject of future work to disentangle this effect from the impact of changing who has a job.
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4.5 Sensitivity analysis
In this section I consider variations of the regressions presented to test for sensitivity. I
present results for some of the main tests, and describe the others. Results are available on
request.
4.5.1 Individual-level results
In Table 1, I estimate the increased likelihood of being in the formal sector of being an
older worker in a strong-EPL state. In Table 2, I test whether the relationship displayed in
Table 1 is stronger in those manufacturing sectors where the involuntary job loss rate in the
United States is higher.
Here, I modify the regressions that produce Tables 1 and 2 in a variety of ways. First,
instead of using the aggregate EPL rating, I use each of the three component ratings (Besley
Burgess 2004, Bhattacharjea 2008, and OECD 2007) separately. The results are similar. All
coefficients remain the same sign, and while several results lose significance, some become
stronger.
In a second set of tests, I treat the aggregate EPL score as a categorical variable rather
than a continuous variable. The coefficients follow the broad pattern that would be ex-
pected, where the coefficients on the higher levels of EPL are generally larger. The coef-
ficients do not move linearly though, possibly because there are few states in some of the
EPL categories.
Next, I estimate each of the regressions in Tables 1 and 2 dropping each state one at a
time, and doing the same for sectors. The results stay very similar throughout. I also drop
the self-employed, use a wide variety of different fixed effects specifications, and include
different individual controls. The results in all cases remain substantively the same.
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4.5.2 Plant-level results
In Table 3, I estimate the relationship between age shift and TFP in plants with at least 100
workers and in those with fewer than 100 workers, which the threshold where the main
EPL takes effect. One concern is that plants select into the above and below 100 worker
categories based on some unobserved characteristic. Plants that are far from the threshold
in either direction are more likely to have chosen a size for some reason other than the EPL
threshold, so restricting the sample to plants that are far from the threshold should minimize
the concern regarding selection. In Table 8, I estimate the same specification as in Table 3,
but I change the employment thresholds to 1 to 49 and 200 and above. The significance for
the small plants goes from the five percent level to the ten percent level, but the coefficient
remains the same sign and similar magnitude.
In Table 4, I test whether new and old plants have different relationships between age
shift and TFP. I define “new” plants as those under 17 years old, but since this is an arbitrary
cutoff, I present the same results as in columns 3 and 4 of Table 4 (that is, controlling for log
labor) for every threshold between 2 and 30 years. For low cutoffs, there is no significant
difference between the coefficients, meaning that I do not reject the null that new and old
plants are affected equally by EPL. For cutoffs above 10 years, the difference is significant
at the 10 percent level, and for cutoffs above 15 years, the difference is significant at the
one percent level. One possible reason that I do not reject the null for low cutoffs is that
relatively few plants are younger than 10 years old (recall that the median age is 17 years).
These results are presented in Table 9.
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5 Conclusion
I have presented a theoretical model and empirical evidence that EPL shifts formal sector
jobs away from young workers in favor of older workers. This happens because a plant
would rather not commit itself to a young worker for future periods, which distorts the
hiring decision. Then when the plant does decide to hire a young worker, it will retain her
when she is old, even if it would prefer to fire her, and both of these effects raise the age
composition of the plant.
In the second part of the paper, I assume that those sector-states that have relatively old
formal sectors are the sectors that are most impacted by EPL. Plants in those sector-states
have lower TFP, which suggests that EPL reduces TFP. There is a relationship among plants
with at least 100 workers, meaning that EPL applies to the plants, but no relationship in the
smaller plants. This is a useful placebo test, so that we can rule out the possibility that an
unobserved omitted variable is driving the results.
I have also presented evidence that is consistent with the hypothesis that the distortion in
who is employed is responsible for at least part of the TFP reduction. I calculate predicted
education rates in the formal sector under different EPL schemes, and find that they are
lower when EPL is stronger. These results are driven by the fact that EPL prevents younger
workers from securing jobs, and younger workers on average have higher education. One
limitation of this approach is that education is an imperfect proxy for productivity, espe-
cially in tasks that are more dependent on experience.
EPL reduces TFP more strongly in old plants than in new plants. This is what we would
expect if EPL reduces TFP by distorting who has a job, because new plants experience only
the apprehension effect, while old plants experience both the apprehension and the legacy
effect. The result on old and new plants can rule out the possibility that EPL reduces TFP
entirely through a mechanism that does not vary over the life of a plant. For example,
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this result is inconsistent with the hypothesis that the only mechanism is that moral hazard
causes effort to decrease by a fixed percentage in every period.
However, there is at least one other possible explanation that is consistent with these
findings: that EPL reduces TFP primarily by distorting the number of people employed,
rather than distorting who is employed. It is plausible that new plants are closer to the
optimal number of employees than older plants, depending on a plant’s strategy regarding
size, which would generate results consistent with the data, because new firms would be
less affected by EPL than older firms. It will be the focus of future work to disentangle
these two mechanisms.
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Tables
Table 1: Formality, age, and employment protection legislation
(1) (2)
Age x EPL 0.936** 1.075**
(0.350) (0.421)
Age -0.002* -0.002**
(0.001) (0.001)
Male 0.060*** 0.073***
(0.016) (0.025)
Observations 22897 22897
Model Linear Probit
The dependent variable is 1 if the worker is formal and 0
otherwise. EPL is divided by 1000 for readability. State-
sector and year fixed effects, and an indicator variable for
level of education, are not reported. Probit coefficients are
marginal effects at the mean. Standard errors (in parenthe-
ses) are clustered at the state level.
Note: * p < .1 ** p < .05 *** p < .01.
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Table 2: Formality, age, separation rate, and EPL
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age x EPL x Firing (US) 0.084** 0.096***
(0.031) (0.026)
Age x EPL x Firing (Latin Am.) 0.139* 0.142***
(0.067) (0.025)
Age -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.002**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.005)
Male 0.060*** 0.074*** 0.063*** 0.049***
(0.016) (0.024) (0.015) (0.094)
Observations 22897 22897 20755 20755
Model Linear Probit Linear Probit
The dependent variable is 1 if the worker is formal and 0 otherwise. Age x EPL
and Age x Firing are included in the regression but not displayed (EPL x Fir-
ing is not included because it collinear with the fixed effects). State-sector and
year fixed effects, and an indicator variable for level of education, are not re-
ported. Probit coefficients are marginal effects at the mean. EPL is divided by
1000 for readability. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the state
level.
Note: * p < .1 ** p < .05 *** p < .01.
Table 3: The relationship between TFP and age shift in large and small plants
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age shift in the sector-state -7.894** 1.696 -8.130** 0.665
(3.760) (4.349) (3.619) (4.208)
Log labor 0.217*** 0.235***
(0.016) (0.025)
Observations 57897 143965 57897 143965
Plant size 100+ 1-99 100+ 1-99
The dependent variable is plant-level TFP. The sample is divided between
plants with below 100 (no EPL) and above 100 (EPL) workers. Sector,
state, and year fixed effects are not reported. Standard errors (in paren-
theses) are clustered at the state level.
Note: * p < .1 ** p < .05 *** p < .01.
38
Table 4: The relationship between TFP and age shift in old and new plants
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age shift in the sector-state -3.290 -12.424*** -2.993 -13.732***
(4.126) (4.139) (4.068) (4.004)
Log labor 0.205*** 0.210***
(0.020) (0.023)
Observations 29128 28769 29128 28769
Plant size 100+ 100+ 100+ 100+
Plant age 1-17 18+ 1-17 18+
The dependent variable is plant-level TFP. Age shift is divided by 1000 for
readability. The sample is divided between new plants and old plants, all
with at least 100 workers. Sector, state, and year fixed effects are not re-
ported. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the state level.
Note: * p < .1 ** p < .05 *** p < .01.
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Table 5: Formality, age, and employment protection legislation: States producing high- and
low-growth goods
(1) (2) (3)
Age x EPL 0.747* 1.122** 0.936**
(0.319) (0.410) (0.350)
Age -0.002 -0.002 -0.002*
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Male 0.097*** 0.040** 0.060***
(0.025) (0.014) (0.016)
Observations 8750 14147 22897
Model Linear Linear Linear
Growth of state Slow Fast All
The dependent variable is 1 if the worker is formal and 0 otherwise. EPL
is divided by 1000 for readability. State-sector and year fixed effects,
and an indicator variable for level of education, are not reported. States
are split into fast- and slow-growth based on their production of fast-
and slow-growing sectors. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clus-
tered at the state level.
Note: * p < .1 ** p < .05 *** p < .01.
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Table 6: Formality, age, separation rate, and EPL: States producing high- and low-growth
goods
(1) (2) (3)
Age x EPL x Firing (US) 0.060 0.065* 0.084**
(0.038) (0.030) (0.031)
Age -0.003 -0.000 -0.001
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Male 0.095*** 0.041** 0.060***
(0.025) (0.014) (0.016)
Observations 8750 14147 22897
Model Linear Linear Linear
Growth of state Slow Fast All
The dependent variable is 1 if the worker is formal and 0 otherwise. Age x EPL and Age
x Firing are included in the regression but not displayed (EPL x Firing is not included
because it collinear with the fixed effects). State-sector and year fixed effects, and an
indicator variable for level of education, are not reported. States are split into fast- and
slow-growth based on their production of fast- and slow-growing sectors. EPL is di-
vided by 1000 for readability. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the state
level.
Note: * p < .1 ** p < .05 *** p < .01.
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Table 7: The relationship between TFP and age shift in old and new plants: Dropping firms
started before 1976
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age shift in the sector-state -3.290 -12.181* -2.993 -12.792**
(4.126) (5.937) (4.068) (5.602)
Log labor 0.205*** 0.233***
(0.020) (0.035)
Observations 29128 12356 29128 12356
Plant size 100+ 100+ 100+ 100+
Plant age 1-17 18+ 1-17 18+
The dependent variable is plant-level TFP. Age shift is divided by 1000 for
readability. The sample is divided between new plants and old plants,
all with at least 100 workers. Firms formed before 1976 are dropped.
Sector, state, and year fixed effects are not reported. Standard errors (in
parentheses) are clustered at the state level.
Note: * p < .1 ** p < .05 *** p < .01.
42
Table 8: The relationship between TFP and age shift in large and small plants: Different
plant-size threshold
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age shift in the sector-state -7.097* 2.105 -7.891** 0.964
(3.561) (4.266) (3.504) (4.093)
Log labor 0.281*** 0.277***
(0.021) (0.028)
Observations 33675 119171 33675 119171
Plant size 200+ 1-49 200+ 1-49
The dependent variable is plant-level TFP. The sample is divided be-
tween plants with below 50 (no EPL) and above 200 (EPL) workers.
Sector, state, and year fixed effects are not reported. Standard errors
(in parentheses) are clustered at the state level.
Note: * p < .1 ** p < .05 *** p < .01.
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Table 9: The relationship between TFP and age shift in old and new plants: different age
cutoffs
Cutoff for
new/old
Coeff. for new
plants
Coeff. for old
plants
Prob > F
2 0.83 -8.2 0.104
3 -0.32 -8.14 0.206
4 -1.6 -8.34 0.194
5 0.34 -9.17 0.117
6 -3.04 -8.89 0.303
7 -4 -8.92 0.301
8 -4.44 -8.83 0.379
9 -2.9 -9.78 0.167
10 -3.15 -9.94 0.116
11 -2.72 -10.46 0.093
12 -2.84 -10.57 0.076
13 -3.39 -10.52 0.08
14 -3.28 -10.94 0.041
15 -3.23 -12.22 0.018
16 -2.89 -13.17 0.007
17 -2.99 -13.73 0.007
18 -3.23 -14.26 0.004
19 -3.68 -14.51 0.006
20 -4.03 -14.8 0.004
21 -5.17 -13.08 0.02
22 -5.1 -13.83 0.014
23 -5.39 -14.03 0.017
24 -5.32 -15.08 0.011
25 -5.05 -16.76 0.001
26 -5.23 -16.47 0.002
27 -5.54 -16.14 0.007
28 -5.51 -17.69 0.003
29 -5.64 -18.23 0.004
30 -5.7 -18.58 0.006
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Each row of Table 9 corresponds to a regression of the same form as Table 4, but with a
different cutoff for when a plant is considered new as opposed to old. See the body of the
paper for more details.
Appendix A: Theory
In this appendix I provide details for several assertions made in the theory portion. Recall
that e ranges from 0 to 1 and f ranges from  1/2 to 1/2, and b ranges from 0 to 1. The
following lemma will be useful:
Lemma: Suppose a smooth function f (e, f ,b ) satisfies two conditions for all (e, f ,b )2
(0,1) x ( 1/2,1/2) x (0,1): (i) lim
e!0
f (e, f ,b ) = 0 and (ii) ∂ f∂e < 0. Then f (e, f ,b )< 0 for
all (e, f ,b ) 2 (0,1) x ( 1/2,1/2) x (0,1).
Proof by contradiction: Suppose that (i) and (ii) are satisfied and there exists some
(eˆ, fˆ , bˆ ) 2 (0,1) x ( 1/2,1/2) x (0,1) such that f (eˆ, fˆ , bˆ )   0. Then f (eˆ/2, fˆ , bˆ ) > 0 by
(ii), and f (e, fˆ , bˆ )> f (eˆ/2, fˆ , bˆ )> 0 for all e< eˆ/2, but this contracts the assumption (i).
Therefore there is a contradiction and the lemma is true. ⇤
Claim 1: For all (e, f ,b ) 2 (0,1) x ( 1/2,1/2) x (0,1),
∂
∂e
z⇤
1+ ez⇤
< 0 (1)
Proof: We know that for e> 0,
z⇤ =
p
be+2be f +1 1
be
, (2)
so
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∂
∂e
z⇤
1+ ez⇤
=[b 2( (2e f + e))+ 4
p
b (2e f + e)+1+4+
2b
⇣
 e(2 f +1)
⇣p
2be f +be+1 2
⌘
+
p
2be f +be+1 1
⌘
]/
2e2
p
b (2e f + e)+1
⇣p
b (2e f + e)+1+b  1
⌘2 (3)
The task remaining is to prove that this quantity is negative for all valid values of e, f ,
and b . I define the numerator of equation (3) as N(e, f ,b ). The denominator of equation
(3) is always positive, so to prove the claim, it is sufficient to show that N(e, f ,b )< 0.
N is smooth, and it can be verified thatlim
e!0
N(e, f ,b ) = 0. That means that showing
∂
∂eN(e, f ,b ) < 0 for all e, f ,b 2 (0,1) x ( 1/2,1/2) x (0,1) is sufficient to show that
N(e, f ,b )< 0, which in turn is sufficient to prove the claim.
∂
∂eN(e, f ,b ) =
 b (2 f +1)
⇣
 4p2be f +be+1+b ⇣p2be f +be+1+ e(6 f +3) 1⌘+4⌘p
b (2e f + e)+1
(4)
It is still not immediately clear that this quantity is negative, so I apply the lemma again.
I define the numerator of the right-hand side of equation (4) asM(e, f ,b). Similar to above,
it can be shown that lim
e!0
N(e, f ,b ) = 0. Again, it is sufficient to show that ∂∂eM(e, f ,b )< 0
to show that M(e, f ,b )< 0. Taking the derivative gives
∂
∂e
M(e, f ,b ) =
 (2b f +b )2
⇣
6
p
b (2e f + e)+1+b  4
⌘
2
p
b (2e f + e)+1
(5)
This expression is negative. The denominator is positive and the squared term in the
numerator is positive. The term in parentheses in the numerator is positive as well (note that
2e f +e> 0), and there is a negative sign applied to numerator, so the expression is negative.
To wrap up, ∂∂eM(e, f ,b ) < 0, so M(e, f ,b ) < 0, so
∂
∂eN(e, f ,b ) < 0, so N(e, f ,b ) < 0,
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and finally, ∂∂e
z⇤
1+ez⇤ < 0 ⇤
Claim 2: For all (e, f ,b ) 2 (0,1) x ( 1/2,1/2) x (0,1),
∂
∂e∂ f
z⇤
1+ ez⇤
< 0 (6)
Proof:
∂
∂e∂ f
z⇤
1+ ez⇤
= 
b 3(2 f +1)
⇣
3
p
b (2e f + e)+1+b  1
⌘
2(b (2e f + e)+1)3/2
⇣p
b (2e f + e)+1+b  1
⌘3 (7)
The denominator is positive, and the numerator is positive as well, because 2 f +1> 0.
There is a negative sign applied to the whole fraction, so the right-hand side is negative. ⇤
Next, there are two predictions about the profitability of firms. Recall that V
Claim 3: For all (e, f ,b) 2 (0,1) x ( 1/2,1/2) x (0,1),
∂
∂e
f(e, f ,b )< 0 (8)
Proof:
∂
∂e
f(e, f ,b ) = 
(2be f +be)
⇣p
2be f +be+1 3
⌘
+4
⇣p
2be f +be+1 1
⌘
2(1 b )b 2e3pb (2e f + e)+1 (9)
We can disregard the denominator because it is positive. It is straightforward to show
that x(
p
x+1  3)+ 4(px+1  1) > 0 for all x > 0, and 2be f + be > 0, so the claim is
true.
Claim 4: For all (e, f ,b ) 2 (0,1) x ( 1/2,1/2) x (0,1),
∂ 2
∂e∂ f
f(e, f ,b )< 0 (10)
47
Proof:
∂ 2
∂e∂ f
f(e, f ,b ) =
2
⇣p
2be f +be)+1 1
⌘
+(2be f +be)
⇣
2
p
2be f +be)+1 3
⌘
2(b  1)be2(b (2e f + e)+1)3/2
(11)
The argument is exactly parallel to the one made to prove Claim 3.
Appendix B: Empirics
In appendix table 1, I present the ratings of EPL strength by state. They are based on three
papers, Besley and Burgess (2004), Bhattacharjea (2008), and OECD (2007). These papers
use different scales, and they have all been converted to a weak ( 1), neutral (0), or strong
(+1) EPL category by Gupta et al. (2009). The last column indicates the sum of the three
ratings for each state, and is what I use for an overall EPL rating.
Appendix table 1 presents the EPL ratings for each state for each of the three different
ratings, as well as the aggregate rating that I use throughout. See the description in the
body of the paper for more information.
Appendix table 2 presents the rank of involuntary job loss rates in the United States and
a group of Latin American countries. A low number indicates a low level of job loss. See
the body of the paper for more information.
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Appendix table B1: EPL ratings by state
BB Bhat. OECD Aggregate
State
Andhra Pradesh -1 0 -1 -2
Assam 0 0 1 1
Bihar 0 0 1 1
Gujurat 0 0 -1 -1
Haryana 0 0 -1 -1
Karnataka -1 -1 0 -2
Kerala -1 0 1 0
Madhya Pradesh 0 0 0 0
Maharashtra 1 1 1 3
Orissa 1 1 0 1
Punjab 0 0 0 0
Rajasthan -1 0 -1 -2
Tamil Nadu -1 -1 0 -2
Uttar Pradesh 0 -1 -1 -2
West Bengal 1 0 1 2
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Appendix table B2: Rank of involuntary job loss rates by sector
NIC-2004
code
IJLR
US Latin Am.
Manufacturing sector
Food manufacturing 15 1 9
Textiles 17 18 11
Clothing 18 18 11
Luggage and shoes 19 18 11
Wood products 20 6 13
Paper products 21 7.5 6.5
Publishing 22 7.5 6.5
Coke, refined petroleum 23 2 3
Chemical products 24 4 3
Rubber and plastics 25 13 3
Non-metallic mineral products 26 5 5
Basic metals 27 14.5 1
Fabricated metals 28 14.5 8
Machinery n.e.c. 29 3 -
Office and computing machinery 30 16 -
Electrical machinery 31 9 -
TV and communication 32 12 -
Medical, optical, clocks 33 20 -
Motor vehicles 34 10.5 -
Other transport equipment 35 10.5 -
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Rents and Economic Growth
Daniel Schwab Eric Werker
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“Without development there is no profit, without profit no development.” Joseph Schum-
peter, The Theory of Economic Development (1934)
1 Introduction
Are rents, or excess profits, good for development?
We seek to answer this question by examining panel data at the industry level and
applying analytical methods from the competition-and-growth literature (see Aghion and
Griffith 2005) to a larger group of countries along the development spectrum. Economic
theory supports both sides of the argument, thereby offering conflicting advice for competi-
tion policy and anticorruption efforts. Surprisingly, there has been little statistical research
in the last decade and a half since data availability has improved to increase the sample
size by two orders of magnitude from earlier studies (e.g. Ades and Di Tella 1999) and the
theoretical debate has become more complex.
On the one hand, rents seem to be a compelling feature of successful economic devel-
opment. “Schumpeterian rents” (Galunic and Rodan 1997) can incentivize innovation and
thus bring about the economic development Schumpeter was talking about, as the economy
became more sophisticated and productive.
A different view of rents and development can be found in North, Wallis, and Weingast
(2009). North and co-authors argue that most societies in history—including today’s devel-
oping economies (North et al. 2007)—are “natural states” in which a dominant coalition of
elites carve up the economy into protected rents that can be collectively enforced. As these
natural states become more consolidated, elites have an interest to promote specialization
and trade in order to increase the amount of rents at play (p. 49). By this mechanism, rents
go part and parcel with political stability, and their presence is required if the economy is
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to develop.1
A third idea can be found in the voluminous access-to-finance literature. Financial
sector development is a key correlate of economic development (Levine 1997). Countries
with less developed economies grow slower. In those countries, retained earnings are an
important source of capital for new investment. It thus seems logical that an economy or
industry that enjoys higher profits or rents should be able to fund a faster expansion.
Taken together, these three conceptualizations highlight the crucial role for rents in eco-
nomic development: as an incentive for innovation, a glue to keep elite interest in stability
and expansion, and a source of capital for investment. Yet in spite of this logic there is a
case to question the notion that high profits are good for economic development.
The strongest challenge to this notion is the flip side to North, Wallis, and Weingast
(2009). Business interests can capture the state (e.g. Stigler 1971), or vice versa (e.g.
Shleifer and Vishny 2002). Rents, rather than being used to promote growth, can be used
to sustain the status quo, which is often one of limited competition. They can lead to
corruption, since bureaucrats who preside over high-rent sectors will be able to extract
more from the private sector (Ades and Di Tella 1999). Rent-seeking activities exhibit
increasing returns to scale, thus making rents self-sustaining, and because they are anti-
innovation provide a further drag on growth (Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny 1993). Rent-
seeking can draw talent from the productive sector and be destructive to entrepreneurship
in particular (Baland and Francois 2000).
The other first-order challenge to the view that rents are good for development is the
flip side to Schumpeter. Rather than being an incentive for innovation, high profits may be
a lack of incentive to do much at all—or, as Hicks (1935) said, “the best of all monopoly
profits is a quiet life” (p. 8). If managers are not profit-maximizing and are lazily enjoying
1Introducing an edited volume that applies North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009) to today’s developing
countries, North et al. (2012) recognize that some rents might generate a drag on growth while others enable
it, but they do not find a pattern across the case studies analyzed (p. 20).
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the rents from limited competition (e.g. Hart 1983), then higher rents can lead to slower
growth rather than more investment. Only when firms are at risk of losing their business
are managers forced to innovate.
To tackle this question, we first construct a model that allows for either productive
rents or unproductive rents. Our model is a basic one to provide the intuition behind our
empirical approach. A number of firms compete in Cournot competition, such that the
profit of each firm is decreasing in the number of other firms in the market. Firms can
either use their profits to create new products or collude to prevent new entrants to the
market, and their profit-maximizing decision depends on the relative returns to each. This
captures the ambiguous overall prediction of the effect of rents on growth.
We model developing countries as having three characteristics. One, a lower quality
of public administration or competition policy makes it easier to bribe regulators to pre-
vent entry. This makes the cost of rent-seeking lower in poorer countries. Two, profits
on new products are higher due to the ability of firms in poor countries to copy existing
technologies. These two features lead to the prediction that observed ex-post profits should
be higher in developing countries, consistent with the financial literature on market seg-
mentation (Bekaert et al. 2011). Three, credit constraints are more likely to be binding in
poor countries. The combined effects result in an ambiguous prediction of whether rents
are better or worse for growth in poor countries than they are in rich countries.
We test the model using the Lerner index as a measure of rents, following Nickell
(1996), Aghion et al. (2005a), and Aghion, Braun, and Fedderke (2008). The Lerner index
(Lerner 1934), also called a mark-up ratio, is equal to the difference between price and
marginal cost divided by price. Under perfect competition, price should equal marginal cost
giving a value of zero for the index. The greater the degree of monopoly pricing, the higher
the index. In practice, marginal cost data are unavailable for large panel data applications,
so mark-up is approximated using a variant of profits over revenues (Aghion et al. 2005a).
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Since firm-level data in less-developed economies is spotty and unavailable in time series
for most countries, we follow Aghion, Braun, and Fedderke (2008) and use industry-level
value-added data from the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO
2013). UNIDO’s INDSTAT data are available for around 20 manufacturing sectors in over
100 countries since the 1960s. The mark-up ratio we calculate is a measure of both rents
and (lack of) competition (Davies 1982), and in both the theory and empirics, we do not
make an attempt to separate these two concepts.
We supplement the UNIDO data on the mark-up ratio with other industry and national-
level variables and test the predictions of the model. Unlike our predictions, which are
ambiguous about the relationship between profits and growth, our results are decidedly
unambiguous. First, we find support for the prediction that observed rents are higher in
less developed countries—virtually any indicator of underdevelopment is associated with
a higher average Lerner in the manufacturing sectors. Second, we find that the relationship
between rents and growth is strongly negative, with the results being primarily driven by
the poorer countries (or those with higher political risk) in the sample. This result, that
higher excess profits are correlated with slower growth in developing countries, is robust
to a series of modifications to the specification including instrumenting for mark-up using
the average mark-up in other industries in the country.
We then split the sample along two dimensions: financial sector development (as mea-
sured by the size of the banking sector relative to GDP) and the degree of external finance
required by the industry (taken from Rajan and Zingales 1998). If access-to-finance con-
straints are binding, then rents may be especially helpful to finance innovation in sectors
that require external finance but in markets with weak financial sector development. In fact,
we find that the effect of rents on growth is especially harmful in this quadrant. In other
words, far from being a way to finance investment out of retained earnings, rents seem to
be the key to limiting competition.
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To be sure, there is potential for endogeneity in our specifications, as evidenced by an
old literature seeking to predict mark-up, but most of the potential critiques work against
our findings. If better-performing firms also acquire market share, then we should see a
positive relationship between mark-up and growth (Demsetz 1973). Since state-owned en-
terprises are important in developing countries, and they are on average less profitable and
efficient than private firms (Boardman and Vining 1989, Megginson and Netter 2001), then
we should see a more positive relationship (negative times negative) between mark-up and
growth in developing economies. If firms in poor countries over-report costs or under-
report profits, we should see less profit rather than more profits in developing economies.
If high-growth industries are more profitable, then we should see a positive relationship be-
tween mark-up and growth. Some remaining critiques are dealt with by our use of multiple
fixed effects specifications and instrumentation strategies.
At the level of the industry, our best measure of protection from “new entrants” is the
level of tariffs. We look at the effect of Lerner on the change in tariffs, which of course have
been on a secular decline over the period of the sample. As predicted by the model, the
higher the Lerner, the slower the reduction in the tariff rate. We also use data from Bloom
et al. (2012) to test for the most likely alternative mechanism, that higher rents cause
slower growth through the channel of allowing managerial slack. We find that controlling
for management has little impact on our estimate of the impact of mark-up on productivity
growth, although we lose some of the explanatory power of their data by collapsing from
the firm level to the country-sector level.
Having established that rents are associated with lower initial development levels, slower
growth within manufacturing sectors, as well as a slower-improving business climate, we
then test whether there are any macroeconomic implications. We include the average level
of mark-up across industrial sectors as a right-hand side variable in standard growth re-
gressions and find that it is a robust negative predictor of economic growth, although the
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differential effect on poorer countries is not distinguishable from zero. A reduction in av-
erage mark-up by one standard deviation predicts higher GDP growth of 0.39 percentage
points (compared to an average annual growth rate in our sample of 2.3 percent), in spite
of the mark-up measure being just for the manufacturing sector. The effect of average
mark-up on GDP growth is about one and a half times the size we would expect just from
the direct effect of mark-up on growth in manufacturing value added, suggesting that high
mark-up in manufacturing is indicitive of high mark-up in non-manufacturing sectors as
well. In a model allowing for conditional convergence, the growth penalty from a one
standard deviation increase in mark-up is about half of the growth advantage from a one
standard deviation reduction in GDP, indicating that the benefits of catch-up growth from
being poor are larger than the costs of having a bad political economy.
Poor countries grow faster than rich countries because of the benefits of catch-up, but
those countries also tend to have higher rents, which slows growth. Developing countries
have a tailwind from being poor in the catch-up sense, but a headwind from being poor
through an inferior political economy of rent-seeking business. Together, these findings
allow for a more contextualized interpretation of the Knack and Keefer (1995) result that
controlling for property rights variables increases rates of convergence.
Our findings are consistent with the earlier political economy literature which finds a
destructive effect of rents (Ades and Di Tella 1999, Baland and Francois 2000) as well
as the business literature seeking to understand how the business environment can help ex-
plain sustained rents. For example, Chacar, Newburry, and Vissa (2010) find that a stronger
antitrust environment is associated with decreases in performance persistence, or sustained
profits. Chari and David (2012) find that the pro-market reforms in India resulted in a de-
crease in firms’ ability to sustain superior profits. They are also consistent with the few
IO papers that examine the link between competition and growth in developing countries.
Carlin, Schaffer, and Seabright (2004) look at firms in transition economies and find that
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monopolies innovate less than firms facing competition, and Gorodnichenko, Svejnar, and
Terrell (2010) find that foreign competition stimulates innovation. The measures of innova-
tion used in these papers roughly correspond to our ownmodeling of innovation, rather than
being inventions per se: new plants, new products, new technologies, or getting quality ac-
creditation. Our comprehensive results are consistent with Diwan, Keefer, and Schiffbauer
(2014)’s study of crony capitalism in Egypt, which was seen by many a cause of the coun-
try’s troubles; they find that firms connected to the Mubarak regime benefitted from trade
protection and subsidies, and the sectors they were in had less competition and growth.
In spite of the broad consistency of our findings with these earlier papers, the paper
makes a unique contribution. Unlike the political economy literature, we explore the man-
ufacturing sectors, and in so doing can use industry-level measures and increase the sample
size from earlier studies by nearly two orders of magnitude. We also examine both mech-
anisms and growth effects. Unlike the business literature, the focus of our paper is not on
firm profitability but instead from industry-level profitability to growth, reforms, and the
overall growth of the economy. The insight is that what may be good for the players in one
industry may not be good for the economy at large. And unlike the IO literature, we focus
on the channel of rent seeking, finding that mechanism to be first order in poorer countries.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the formal model.
Section 3 describes the data and empirical specifications. Section 4 contains the main
results establishing the link between rents and growth at the level of the industry. Section
5 evaluates the mechanisms of rent-seeking and managerial slack. Section 6 explores the
growth implications. Section 7 concludes.
2 A simple model
In this section we develop a simple model to illustrate the tradeoff between rent-seeking
and growth. It is not meant to capture all of the complexities of competition, especially in
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the developing world; rather, it should be taken as illustrative. We model rents or mark-up
as determined by the level of competition within a market. Rent-seeking is the attempted
blocking of a new entrant into the market by bribing or lobbying bureaucrats, and it is
easier when the level of development is lower. Probabilistic entry is similar to the model
in Aghion et al. (2005b), although they focus on entrance of foreign firms. Growth occurs
when a firm innovates to produce a new product, which generates an increased incentive
for a firm in a more competitive environment to innovate to leave the competition behind,
as in Arrow (1962).
2.1 Set-up
In the first period, N identical firms compete in quantities, producing a homogenous
good with inverse demand given by P(Q) = f  gQ, where Q is the total quantity produced
and f and g are positive parameters. Marginal cost is constant at c, and f > c. The total
profit generated by the firms is
p(N) = ( f   c
N+1
)2(
N
g
). (1)
Mark-up of price over marginal cost is higher when N is lower, so high N in the theory
corresponds to lowmark-up in the empirical section. In between the first and second period,
a potential innovator will have the option to pay a fixed cost h to leave the original market
(market A) and create a new product, allowing it to operate as a monopolist in market B,
earning a profit of pM. The firm may be prevented from undertaking a profitable innovation
by a credit constraint; it may spend only the profits it earns in the first period and an
exogenous level of credit l .
Whether or not the firm decides to innovate corresponds to productivity growth in the
empirical section.2 If the potential innovator decides to stay in market A, the incumbents
2 As will be discussed below, productivity is measured in revenue terms, rather than physical terms.
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then collusively decide on a level of rent-seeking, which reduces the likelihood of an ad-
ditional competitor in the second period. If they collectively spend a, then the probability
of an additional firm entering is 1 apa, with a > 0 an indication of how easy it is to
persuade bureaucrats to restrict entry. Note that the credit constraint can never bind here:
the firms never want to spend more on rent-seeking than they earned in profits in the first
period, because that would guarantee losses.
If an entrant does not arrive, the incumbents will once again earn p(N) in the second
period. If one does, they will earn
p(N+1)⇤ N
N+1
= (
f   c
N+2
)2(
N
g
). (2)
For convenience, we define the reduction in total profits for the N incumbents caused
by entry as d(N):
d(N)⌘ p(N) p(N+1)⇤ N
N+1
. (3)
It is natural to treat N as a discrete variable, but we can also consider it as a continuous
variable when analyzing the effect of a change in N. Note that the reduction in profits
caused by one additional entrant is declining in N (because moving from a monopoly to a
duopoly reduces profits far more than moving from 12 firms to 13):
d0(N) = ( f   c)
2
g
(
N 1
(N+1)2
  N 2
(N+2)2
)< 0. (4)
The solution concept is symmetric Nash equilibrium. This allows us to disregard im-
Creating a newmarket is only one way to generate more value per worker, but it is an important one, especially
in poor countries where relatively few different kinds of goods are being produced (Hidalgo and Hausmann
2009).
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plausible equilibria where, for example, the incumbents could threaten to produce huge
quantities in the second period if the potential innovator did not leave the market, or where
one incumbent paid less than their share of the rent-seeking. It also allows us to ignore
what happens in market A if the innovator leaves, because the outcome of interest is the
innovation itself. Working backwards, if the innovator stays in market A, the incumbents’
total profits in the second period as a function of rent-seeking will be
p(N,a) = p(N) d(N)⇤ (1 apa) a. (5)
Solving the first-order condition gives
a⇤ = (
1
2
ad(N))2, (6)
and
p(N,a⇤) = p(N+1)⇤ N
N+1
+
1
4
a2d(N)2. (7)
Thus, the firm will innovate if the fixed cost is less than the additional profits that are
created:
h pM  p(N,a
⇤)
N
⌘ hwant , (8)
and it has sufficient credit:
h p(N)
N
+l ⌘ hcan. (9)
We can interpret hwant as the highest fixed cost where innovation is still profitable and
hcan as the highest fixed cost where innovation is feasible given the credit constraint. To
ensure that 1 apa remains above zero, it is sufficient to assume that a <p2d(N). The
purpose of this assumption is just to guarantee an interior solution so that we don’t have to
keep track of the possibility that rent-seeking drives the probability of entry to zero.
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2.2 Comparative statics
2.2.1 Profits and development
In considering the relationship between observed profits and the development of a coun-
try, we analyze the situation where the potential innovator stays in the original market; in-
novation is generally difficult so this is more likely to be the relevant case. The change in
total profits as a function of a can be found from equation (7):
∂p
∂a
=
1
2
ad(N)2 > 0. (10)
Therefore we expect that profits will be higher in countries with lower quality of gov-
ernment institutions (higher a), consistent with the political risk premium demanded by
investors in such jurisdictions, and this result is confirmed in the data.
2.2.2 Productivity growth and competitiveness
An exogenous increase in the number of firms has two effects: it is less profitable for
the potential innovator to stay in market A, which encourages it to flee from competition
and create the second market, but it also reduces profits in the first period, which may
prevent it from doing so. The result is that without appealing to the data, we cannot make
any predictions of the effect on growth of increasing N and reducing mark-up.
2.2.3 Productivity growth and development
There are three relevant differences between rich and poor countries in the model. First,
we assume that rent-seeking is easier in poor countries; this is motivated by the fact that
corruption is generally decreasing with development. When rent-seeking is easier (i.e., a
is higher), the potential innovator has less incentive to create a new market, increasing the
maximum fixed cost it would be willing to incur:
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∂hwant
∂a
=   ∂
∂a
p(N,a⇤)
a
(11)
=  ad(N)
2N
< 0 (12)
Second, there is unconditional convergence in manufacturing productivity because of
the availability in catch-up growth (Rodrik 2013). To incorporate that fact into the model,
we assume that the profits generated by an innovator (pM) are higher in poor countries,
because in poor countries it is possible to copy existing technology to create a new market.
Increasing pM raises the threshold fixed cost that the innovator is willing to pay, making
productivity growth more likely, because ∂h
want
∂pM = 1.
Finally, the credit constraint may be more likely to bind in poor countries because there
is less access to financial markets, which would make innovation more difficult. Two of
these effects indicate that productivity growth should be lower in poor countries, and one
suggests that it should be higher, but we cannot predict which side dominates without
making further assumptions.
2.2.4 Productivity growth and the interaction of competitiveness and development
The differential effect of rent-seeking in rich and poor countries is a central question
of this paper. In the model, with tension built in between the temptation to rent seek and
the reward to innovate, we have ambiguous predictions for each of competitiveness and
development on productivity growth, and not surprisingly we also generate an ambigous
prediction on the cross partial without further assumptions.
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3 Data and Empirical Specifications
3.1 Rents, competition, and mark-up
We are interested in the relationship between the business environment and productivity
growth, and there are two related concepts that we can use to describe the former. The first
is rents, or excess profits, defined as a fraction:
rents=
revenue  total cost
revenue
. (13)
The second is the competitiveness of the market, which is commonly measured by the
Lerner index, or mark-up ratio:
Lerner=
price  marginal cost
price
. (14)
In practice, we do not observe the data that would be required to calculate either rents
or the Lerner index exactly, but we can use the data that is available to generate a good
approximation. Following Aghion, Braun, and Fedderke (2008), we define mark-up as
follows,
mark-up=
value added wage bill
revenue
. (15)
Since value added is revenue minus cost of materials, and total variable cost is the sum
of the wage bill and the cost of materials, we can also write,
mark-up=
revenue - total variable cost
revenue
. (16)
The only discrepancy between our definition of mark-up and rents is that rents should
also subtract depreciation of capital, so mark-up will be higher than true rents. We have
access to data on capital expenditures, but not to capital stocks. We do use sector fixed
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effects throughout, so to the extent that depreciation as a fraction of output is similar across
countries within the same manufacturing sector, we can address this concern. Also, as a
robustness check, we proxy for depreciation using a lagged average of capital expenditures
and the main results hold.
To see how our definition of mark-up approximates the true Lerner index, substitute
average variable cost for marginal cost, and multiply the numerator and denominator by
the quantity sold:
Lernert price⇤quantity  average variable cost⇤quantity
price⇤quantity , (17)
which is exactly the definition of mark-up in (16). With the data that we have, we can-
not distinguish between competitiveness and rents, so we remain agnostic as to which one
drives the results and use the two terms interchangeably throughout the paper. Disentan-
gling the two remains on our agenda for future research.
Productivity is defined by
productivity =
value added
employees
, (18)
and
productivity growth in year t =
productivity in t productivity in t 1
productivity in t 1 (19)
Note that productivity growth, our main dependent variable of interest, is defined as the
change in the value added per worker, rather than the change in the number of units created
per worker. In some ways, this is desirable, as a change from low quality coffee beans to
gourmet beans will show up as a change in our definition of productivity, but it would not
if we only focused on physical productivity. The downside to our approach is that value
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added also reflects market power, so that an identical pound of coffee beans is reported as
different levels of value added if the producer is a monopolist instead of a competitive firm,
and productivity growth may also reflect a change in competitiveness (Foster, Haltiwanger,
and Syverson 2008).
Many papers in the literature define productivity growth as improvement in total factor
productivity; that is, the change in the output that could be generated from a given quantity
of labor and capital. We cannot use the same measure because we lack data on capital,
but we do not view this as a limitation. If firms are diverting firms away from capital
investment in favor of wasteful rent-seeking, that would show up as no change in total
factor productivity but a decrease in productivity, and this is exactly the kind of damage
from rent-seeking that we are interested in.
3.2 Empirical Specifications
In the primary specification of the model, we assume that productivity growth from
time t  1 to t is a function of lagged mark-up, log GDP per capita, and fixed effects for
year, country, and sector, with or without an interaction term of mark-up times log GDP
per capita. That is, we assume
Pi jt = b1Mi jt 1+b2Yit 1+b3Mi jt 1 ⇤Yit 1+ui jt , (20)
where i indexes countries, j indexes manufacturing sectors, and t indexes time. We assume
that the error term is uncorrelated with the independent variables, so
E[Mi jtui jt ] = E[Yitui jt ] = E[Mi jtYitui jt ] = 0. (21)
Value added in time t 1 is part of the definition of productivity growth from t 1 to t
and mark-up in t 1, so it appears on both sides of (20), meaning that a spurious negative
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correlation would arise even in the absense of causality. In our main specification, we
instrument for mark-up in period t  1 with mark-up in the same country-sector in period
t 2.
Fixed effects for country allow us to control for omitted variables that are constant
within a country over time, such as geography. Sector fixed effects control for the possibil-
ity that our results are being driven by different compositions of sectors being produced in
rich and poor countries, and time fixed effects allow for arbitrary time trends in the data.
We allow for heteroskedasticity in the error term as well as correlation in the error term
within a country by clustering standard errors at the country level (we also tried cluster-
ing at the country-sector level and found the standard errors were lower, so we cluster at
the country level throughout). In other variations we consider different fixed effects spec-
ifications and replace productivity growth with growth in value added and log GDP with
political stability.
3.3 Data
The INDSTAT2 2013 ISIC Revision 3, published by the Statistics Unit of the United
Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) is our main source for manufac-
turing data. It covers over 160 countries from 1963 to 2010, categorized according to the
2-digit level of the International Standard Industrial Classification. UNIDO collects the
data from a variety of sources, including national publications, published and unpublished
international sources, and statisticians employed by UNIDO. Informal manufacturing is
often excluded from these sources, so this paper should be regarded as addressing only
formal manufacturing.
There are 23 manfacturing categories in the original data, but there are four pairs of cat-
egories that are only reported separately starting in the 1980s, and we combine those sectors
back together for continuity. We also exclude the recycling sector due to lack of coverage,
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leaving us with 18 sectors. To give a sense of the fineness of the data, three examples
of sectors are textiles, chemicals, and wood products excluding furniture. Manufacturing
contributes more to GDP in some countries than others: at the 10th percentile among our
observations, it makes up 7 percent of the economy, whereas at the 90th percentile it makes
up 29 percent.
The data we use are value added, output, wages (all reported in current US dollars),
and employees, which are converted to constant (year 2000) values by multiplying by the
US real GDP and dividing by the nominal US GDP, as reported in the World Development
Indicators (WDI). We use these data to calculate productivity and mark-up as described
above. Some countries are missing data required to calculate mark-up; there are 49 coun-
tries with sufficient data to calculate mark-up in 1963, between 74 and 91 from 1970 to
2008, and fewer for 2009 and 2010. Appendix table C1 lists the countries in the sample
and the number of years where they have sufficient data to be included in the preferred
specification.
The case of Latvia is instructive to describe the UNIDO data in action. As Latvia
conducted dramatic reforms upon its emergence from the Soviet Union in an effort to join
the European Union (see Di Tella, Abdelal, and Kindred 2012), the average mark-up in
its manufacturing sectors fell steadily, from 30% in 1994 to just 13% in 2009. At first
productivity growth was high as jobs were slashed, but quickly it fell as the economy
struggled to reach a new equilibrium. In the five years from 1995, productivity growth
averaged 3% while the mark-up averaged 26%. In the five years from 2002, during which
Latvia was one of the fastest growing countries in Europe, productivity growth averaged
19% while the mark-up averaged 19%. In 2008, during the global financial crisis which
took a particularly bad toll on Latvia, productivity growth fell to -21% and margins were
tight at 14%.
The WDI, published by the World Bank and updated in 2013, provides a number of
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other variables we use. They include the cost of starting a business, which is an indica-
tion of the healthiness of the business environment, and is available from 2003 to 2010.
There are also controls used in the growth regressions, which cover from 1970 to 2010:
government consumption as a percentage of GDP, gross enrollment in secondary school,
population growth, and life expectancy. Finally, the WDI is the source for GDP per capita
(in 2000 USD), and for M2 as a percentage of GDP, which we take as a proxy for the
development of the financial sector, both of which are available from 1963 to 2010.
The International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) provides data on political and social
attributes from 1984 to 2010, compiled by experts in each country (PRS Group 2012). Mil-
itary in politics, corruption, and bureaucratic quality are three components of the political
risk rating, which we relabel political stability for clarity. In all cases, a higher number is
better, so we relabel their variable corruption as “lack of corruption,” etc. These variables
are rescaled from 0 to 1.
3.4 Summary Statistics
In table 10 we provide summary statistics for some of the most important variables.
Mark-up, productivity growth, and value added growth are all Winsorized, meaning that
any values outside of the 1st to 99th percentiles are replaced by the 1st or 99th percentile
values, to limit the impact of outliers.
The average mark-up is 24.5% in the poorer countries in the sample and 21.2% in the
richer countries. Of course, this excludes capital deductions (which would probably am-
plify the difference) and it accords with the prediction from the model that profits are higher
in poor countries. Average productivity growth of 5.6% in poor countries is slightly higher
than the 4.4% in rich countries, consistent with the catch-up growth we model and with Ro-
drik (2013) which finds absolute convergence in manufacturing productivity across coun-
tries. An average of 13.9 of the 18 sectors are being actively produced in the poor countries
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in the year 2000 compared with 16.5 in the rich countries, consistent with Hausmann and
Hidalgo (2009) in which richer countries produce more products. Corruption, political sta-
bility, wealth, and
Table 10: Summary statistics
Poor Rich
mean sd mean sd
Average mark-up 0.245 0.086 0.212 0.069
Productivity growth 0.056 0.308 0.044 0.195
Lack of corruption 0.446 0.167 0.698 0.209
Political stability 0.584 0.113 0.781 0.102
Log GDP per capita 6.77 0.93 9.34 0.75
Log productivity 9.23 1.04 10.47 0.87
Sectors produced in 2000 (out of 18) 13.92 5.53 16.48 1.60
Note: See text for sources.
productivity fall in normal ranges and vary across the two samples as would be expected.
3.5 Correlates of mark-up
Our model predicts higher mark-up in less developed countries. We model develop-
ment as the ease of bribing a bureaucrat to prevent the entry of a new firm. This measure
correlates with income per capita but may be better approximated with other measures
of political and bureaucratic development. In this subsection we show that virtually any
measure of underdevelopment is correlated with a higher mark-up. Our variables are not
cherry-picked. This correlation is consistent and robust.
To give a sense of the types of environment where we observe high mark-up, table
11 presents some correlates of mark-up. All of the variables are coded so that high num-
bers are better, and in every column, the dependent variable is mark-up (observed at the
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country-year level). The are no country fixed effects, meaning we are pooling obser-
vations across countries; the signs on the coefficients are the same when country fixed
effects are included, but not significant (not reported). In the first column, the only in-
dependent variables are real log GDP per capita and fixed effects for year, and we see
that poor countries tend to have higher mark-up. In the other columns, we control for
GDP per capita so that we are not just picking up the income effect on high mark-up.
Column 2 examines whether countries that are more likely to have military involvement
in politics have higher mark-up; the correlation between military in politics is stronger
than that for GDP. Columns 3 - 6 show that low mark-up is correlated with overall polit-
ical stability (column 3), good bureaucracy (column 4), a low start-up cost for new busi-
nesses (column 5), and low corruption (column 6)—most of which are better predictors of
mark-up than income per capita. These findings would not be surprising to investors in
emerging markets who assign a larger political risk premium to riskier jurisdictions, effec-
tively increasing the discount rate on the investment and requiring a higher rate of return.
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Table 11: Correlates of Mark-up
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log GDP per capita -0.011 0.001 0.002 0.002 -0.011 -0.004
(-2.60) (0.18) (0.27) (0.35) (-1.75) (-0.73)
Military out of politics -0.075
(-3.74)
Political stability -0.198
(-2.70)
Bureaucracy quality -0.025
(-3.20)
Low start-up cost -0.237
(-1.36)
Lack of corruption -0.074
(-2.70)
Observations 3126 1604 1603 1604 493 1604
R-squared 0.083 0.152 0.118 0.130 0.102 0.100
Note: t-values in parentheses. All variables are coded so that high values are good.
There are year fixed effects. The unit of observation is a country-year. Standard
errors are robust and clustered at the country level. See text for sources.
4 Results
4.1 Primary specification
The results for the primary (IV) specification and two comparison OLS regressions are
in table 12.
The dependent variable in every column is productivity growth from period t  1 to t.
The first three regressions are IV, with mark-up in period t 2 instrumenting for mark-up
in period t 1,3 as discussed above, and the fourth and fifth columns are OLS.
3 To test for a weak instrument, we consider the Kleibergen-Paap (2006) F-statistic, which is the appro-
priate first stage statistic in the presence of heteroskedasticity and clustered standard errors (Baum, Schaffer,
Stillman 2010). If the interaction term is omitted, meaning that mark-up in period t 1 is instrumented with
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Table 12: The effect of rents on productivity growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
IV IV IV OLS t – 1 OLS t – 2
Mark-up -0.319 -0.322 -0.314 -0.498 -0.240
(-9.10) (-9.17) (-9.60) (-13.12) (-10.11)
Log GDP per capita -0.033 -0.031 -0.034 -0.031
(-1.44) (-1.39) (-1.52) (-1.35)
Mark-up x log GDP 0.058 0.099 0.037
(2.71) (4.00) (2.53)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 35031 35031 35031 35031 35031
R-squared 0.115 0.116 0.119 0.124 0.094
Note: t-values in parentheses. Productivity growth is measured from time t   1 to t. In the first
three columns, we instrument for mark-up in t  1 with mark-up in t  2. In the fourth and fifth
columns, we use OLS with mark-up measured in period t 1 or t 2. The unit of observation is
a country-sector-year. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the country level.
In the first model, mark-up is the only independent variable, along with fixed effects for
country, sector, and year. In the second, real log GDP per capita is included as a control,
to ensure that mark-up is not just a proxy for low GDP. Mark-up is strongly significant
and is negatively correlated with productivity growth. The third column is our primary
specification, where the interaction term of (log GDP per capita x mark-up) is also included,
which is statistically significant and positive. This provides evidence for one of the main
claims in the paper: a lack of competition is most harmful in poor countries.
mark-up in period t 2, the F value is over 2,000. With the interaction term, where the instruments are mark-
up in period t  2 and mark-up in period t  2 x log GDP per capita in t  1 and the endogenous variables
are the same variables but measured one period forward, the F value is over 300. The large F-stastics suggest
that measurement error may be a relatively minor concern.
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The interaction term here has been demeaned, or defined as (mark-up - mean mark-
up) x (log GDP - mean log GDP), implying that the coefficients reported on mark-up and
log GDP in the third column can be interpreted as the effect of those respective variables
when the other variable is at its mean (Balli and Sørenson 2013). If we did not demean the
interaction term, then the reported coefficient on mark-up would be the effect of a change
in mark-up when log GDP was zero, which (thankfully) does not happen often. Notice that
the reported coefficients on log GDP and mark-up are similar moving from column (2) to
column (3).
The magnitude of the effect is large, but not implausibly so. The standard deviation
of mark-up is about .12, with a mean of .23. Based on the results in the third column, we
predict a one standard deviation decrease in mark-up would increase productivity growth
in a poor country (25th percentile of wealth) by 4.7 percentage points, and in a rich country
(75th percentile of wealth) by 2.9 percentage points. This is substantial compared to the
mean of
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Figure 1: Marginal effect of mark-up on productivity growth by income
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Note: The dependent variable is the marginal effect of mark-up on productivity, evaluated at
different income levels. It is based on column 3 of table 12.
productivity growth, 5.2 percent, but we regard it as believable because the standard devi-
ation is quite high, at 26 percent.
The fourth column presents an OLS regression where mark-up is measured in period
t 1. The magnitude of the coefficient on mark-up is approximately 50 percent larger than
in our primary specification in column 3, an indication that it is important to instrument
with lagged mark-up to avoid measurement error problems. The fifth column is also OLS,
with mark-up in period t 2. Here the results are similar to our primary specification, but
the coefficients are somewhat closer to zero, as expected.
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In figure 1, we show the marginal effect of mark-up on productivity growth at different
income levels, based on our preferred specification (column 3), with a 95 percent confi-
dence interval. Here we see graphically that mark-up is damaging at all income levels
(except possibly at the very highest levels), and more so at lower incomes.
4.2 Robustness
4.2.1 Instrumenting for mark-up
The primary challenge to our claim is that some unobserved variable is causing both
high mark-up and low productivity growth. A perfect instrument would affect productivity
growth only through the channel of mark-up and vary exogenously in a way that is orthog-
onal to any unobserved variables. Finding such an instrument is difficult for a data set that
covers so many countries and years, as Aghion, Braun, and Fedderke (2008) find. They
write that the opening of the economy to trade, the degree of tradability of the industry,
and the level of tariffs all were weak instruments. We can add terms of trade shocks to the
list of variables that generate weak first stages. Their most successful instrument is import
penetration, which is relevant in one of their two datasets, but not in the UNIDO dataset
that their paper and ours both use, and it also suffers from some endogeneity concerns.
We propose another instrument for mark-up, which we acknowledge is also not perfect.
It is the simple average of mark-up in the other sectors in the same country-year, a similar
strategy to that used in Brander, Du, and Hellman (2014) which follows Berry, Levinsohn,
and Pakes (1995) and others that instrument with local market conditions. Structurally,
this instrument is coherent in that the return to capital should be more or less equal across
industries within a country-year. The main appeal of this as an instrument is that it allows
us to rule out correlated intra-sector measurement error as well as at least some of the
possible omitted variables that could be driving our results, namely those that are specific
to a particular sector. For example, we can rule out a story where new inventions both
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cause high productivity growth and allow for entry, driving down mark-ups and generating
a negative relationship between mark-up and productivity growth. If that were the case,
and the effect was limited to the sector that had the invention, then our instrumentation
strategy would yield no relationship because the predicted mark-up would not be affected
by the invention. Similarly, our IV results indicate that our results cannot be driven by
a productivity shock that is specific to a sector, where a negative shock decreases output
and raises prices relative to costs.4 The instrument has another desirable quality in that any
instrumental-variables procedure can only identify the impact of the mark-up that co-varies
with the instrument (Angrist 2004). In this case, the average mark-up in other sectors is
likely to capture the mark-up that is driven by the overall business environment, which
comes close to the phenomenon that we are trying to uncover in the first place—whether
rents for business are good for growth.
Our results with the instrument are presented in table 13. The first two columns are
the first stage results, with the dependent variables of mark-up and mark-up x log GDP.
Mark-up in other sectors is highly predictive of mark-up and mark-up in other sectors x
4We thank Sam Peltzman for suggesting this possibility.
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Table 13: Instrumenting for mark-up with mark-up in other sectors
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1st: mark-up 1st: inter. IV IV
Mark-up -0.369 -0.519
(-2.54) (-3.02)
Mark-up x log GDP 0.335
(2.96)
Mark-up other sectors 0.662 0.207
(16.77) (2.83)
Other mark-up x GDP 0.076 0.550
(3.40) (9.56)
Log GDP per capita -0.005 -0.008 -0.034 -0.027
(-0.83) (-0.66) (-1.47) (-1.25)
Observations 35031 35031 35031 35031
R-squared 0.471 0.285 0.118 0.103
Note: t-values in parentheses. The first two columns present the
first stage, and the second two present IV results. In the first two
columns, the dependent variables are mark-up and mark-up x log
GDP respectively, and in the other two it is productivity growth from
t 1 to t. In the third and fourth columns, simple average of mark-up
in the other sectors of the same country ("other mark-up") and other
mark-up x log GDP are used as instruments for mark-up and mark-
up x log GDP, all in t  1. The third and fourth columns should be
compared to the second and third columns of table 12. In every col-
umn there are fixed effects for country, year, and sector. The unit of
observation is a country-sector-year. Standard errors are robust and
clustered at the country level.
log GDP is highly predictive of mark-up x log GDP. The Kleibergen-Paap F statistic is
24.8, above the rule of thumb of 10. The next two are the IV results, with and without an
interaction term. In the regression with no interaction term (column 3), the coefficient on
mark-up is similar to our main specification that simply instruments with lagged mark-up
(-0.37 compared to -0.32). With the interaction term included (column 4), the coefficient on
mark-up x log GDP is still significant, but it is much higher than in our main specification
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(0.34 compared to 0.058). We take this as further evidence that mark-up is most damaging
in poor countries, but we should be cautious when making statements about the magnitude
of the difference.
4.2.2 Alternate fixed effects
In our primary specification, we have fixed effects for year, country, and sector. In the
first two columns of appendix table C2, we remove one fixed effect, so that we have year
and sector fixed effects and then year and country fixed effects. Removing the country fixed
effects moderates the coefficient on mark-up from about -0.3 to -0.2, and on the interaction
term from about 0.06 to 0.045. This is an indication that the relationship between mark-
up and productivity growth is strongest when looking within a particular country, but the
relationship is still evident when all countries are lumped together. Removing the sector
fixed effects has surprisingly little impact on our estimated coefficients.
We also consider specifications with finer-grained fixed effects. With country-sector
and year fixed effects, we are comparing French clothing manufacturing to French cloth-
ing manufacturing at different dates, but not two different French manufacturing sectors or
two different countries. The coefficient on mark-up approximately doubles to -0.6, and the
interaction term also becomes stronger, with a coefficient of 0.11, further evidence that the
relationship between mark-up and productivity growth is strongest when looking within
countries rather than between them. If we use country-year and sector fixed effects, mean-
ing we compare data from Chile in 1980 but not across countries or years, the coefficient
on mark-up is about the same as the primary specification, at -0.31, while the coefficient
on the interaction is only 0.037. In every case, there is significance on both.
One advantage to this strategy is that we can rule out the possibility that all of the change
in productivity growth is being driven by variation at the country-year level. For example,
it is not possible that our results are being driven entirely by the business cycle (or any other
79
national-level panel data variable), because then mark-up would have no relationship with
productivity growth when country-year fixed effects were included.
In the final column we remove all fixed effects entirely and the broad results hold.
4.2.3 Alternate variables and longer horizons
In appendix table C3, we examine the robustness of the results to replacing log GDP
per capita with ICRG’s political stability measure and productivity growth with growth in
value added. Political stability and GDP per capita are closely correlated (r = 0.76), which
is not surprising as rich countries tend to have more stable, better functioning governments.
Political stability is probably a better proxy for the feasibility of rent-seeking than wealth,
but GDP per capita has better coverage, so that is what we use in the main specification.
Growth in value added, also defined in percentage terms, is a useful check because
we want to make sure that we are really capturing a positive outcome when productivity
growth increases. If the output of a manufacturing sector drops by 50% and the employment
drops by 75%, then we would say that productivity doubled, even though it is questionable
whether the economy is really in a better position, especially in light of the fact that produc-
tivity in the manufacturing sector tends to be higher than in the overall economy (Rodrik
2013).
In the fifth column, we consider annualized productivity growth over a five-year period
to allow for the possibility that it takes time for a less competitive business environment
to affect growth. We use a non-overlapping specification starting including 1964, 1969,
etc., with the starting year chosen to maximize the sample (results are similar for different
starting years).
Table C3 shows that all of the main results hold when making these substitutions. The
only exception is that the interaction term of mark-up x political stability is not significant
when the dependent variable is productivity growth.
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4.2.4 Alternate samples and Lerner
In appendix table C4 we examine the robustness of the results to dropping different
subsamples of the data. First, our story is fundamentally about domestic business markets,
and one may be worried that the data combine multinational activity with domestic manu-
facturing. We looked at the OECD statistics of outward value added activity by American
and Japanese multinationals (the only countries that provided these data) in manufacturing
and isolated the four categories with the highest share of multinational activity: electronics,
motor vehicles, chemical products, and precision manufactures. In column 1 we drop these
four industries and the results are barely changed, indicating that our results are driven by
limitations on domestic entry, not just on foreign firms. Second, our model expects some
underlying level of competition, but the sample includes small countries like Lesotho (with
three years of observations) that may simply not offer the depth for competitive dynamics
to result. In column 2 we drop the ten percent of the observations coming from the coun-
tries with the smallest population. The results are barely changed. Third, the construction
of the competition measure is at the level of the country-industry, but in fact many firms
compete with other firms from different countries in export markets. A Herfindahl measure
would have been much more inappropriate given this dynamic than the Lerner is, but it is
still interesting to examine whether the results are driven by the non-tradeables. In column
3 we examine export shares by country-industry-year and drop the most traded half of the
sample. The results hold.
Next, in column 4 we redefine the Lerner index to subtract out our best measure of
depreciation, which we define rather crudely as the average of the prior 5 years of capital
expenditures. Again, the results hold.
In one final unreported robustness check, we confirm that dropping the three natural
resource manufacturing sectors leaves the coefficients of interest essentially unchanged.
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4.3 Credit Constraints
The evidence thus far indicates that high rents slow productivity growth, particularly
in poor countries, but perhaps we can find subsamples where they are beneficial. We are
looking for a case where rents could alleviate credit constraints, which is most likely in a
sector where finance is important and in a country where the financial system is unlikely
to provide loans in the absence of rents. Our measure for the external finance required in a
sector is from Rajan and Zingales (1998), who use US firm-level data to characterize sectors
by the amount of capital they require, and we split the 18 sectors into the nine with more
and less capital required. Their argument (and ours) is that dependence on finance by US
firms captures technological differences between sectors. Our proxy for financial market
development is M2 as a fraction of GDP, from theWDI (2013), and we split countries based
on their overall average M2/GDP, so that a country does not move between categories in
different years.
Table 14 gives the results of our primary specification broken down into the quadrants
of high and low finance required and financial market development. If rents can be useful,
we would expect mark-up to be least damaging where finance is important and difficult
to acquire (column 3) and most damaging in the opposite case (column 2). In fact, we
see the reverse, where the coefficient on mark-up is most negative is column 3 and least
negative in column 2. We cannot say that mark-up is most damaging in column 3, as the
coefficient is very close to the one in column 4 when external finance needs are also high but
financial market development is better, but we can reject the hypothesis that the coefficients
in columns 2 and 3 are equal at the 1% confidence level. We interpret this as evidence that
barriers to entry raise the returns for incumbents to keep a sector uncompetitive. This is
consistent with our model, where firms divert more resources towards rent-seeking when it
is easier to keep entrants out. It may also provide one explanation for the surprising finding
82
(Singh 1997) that firms in emerging markets were less likely to use retained earnings to
finance growth than developed-country firms: when retained earnings are high, they don’t
need to grow at all.
5 Mechanism
The focus in the previous sections was that anticompetitive practices damage productiv-
ity growth. Here we argue that this occurs through the political economy channel. We test
through the only potential country-sector variable on rent seeking for which we have data,
tariffs, and find that tariffs fall more slowly in sectors with rents. Tariffs are not a direct
measure of barriers to entry of other domestic firms, but they do affect the cost of imported
substitutes.
Table 14: Mark-up and productivity growth in sub-samples
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mark-up -0.351 -0.196 -0.457 -0.446
(-7.50) (-4.77) (-5.58) (-5.17)
Log GDP per capita -0.082 0.053 -0.086 0.022
(-2.31) (1.68) (-2.51) (0.94)
Finance required Low Low High High
Financial sector development Low High Low High
Observations 8956 8242 8903 8814
R-squared 0.108 0.156 0.121 0.224
Note: t-values in parentheses. The dependent variable, productiv-
ity growth, is measured from time t   1 to t. We instrument for
mark-up in t 1 with mark-up in t 2. The unit of observation is
a country-sector-year. External finance required is from Rajan and
Zingales (1998) and M2/GDP is fromWDI (2013). There are fixed
effects for country, year, and sector. Standard errors are robust and
clustered at the country level.
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We also test for an alternate channel broadly consistent with the main specification in the
previous section, which is lazy management. That is, firms in high-rent sectors can rest
on their laurels. Although our data coverage is limited, we do not find support for the
hypothesis that slower growth is due to weaker management.
5.1 Tariffs
Tariff rates have been falling on average, but they are less likely to fall when firms
are earning higher profits. This should be a surprise, since the main argument in favor of
tariffs is to protect fledgling industries that need help in getting established. Tariff data
come from the TRAINS database, published by the United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development (2013). Tariffs are weighted averages, either for the actual tariffs applied
(labeled AHS in the dataset), or for the tariffs applied to countries without a special trade
agreement (MFN). Both cover the years between 1988 and 2008.
The dependent variable is the percentage change in the tariff rate, so that a change from
100% to 50% is considered the same as the change from 20% to 10%. The most extreme
1% of values on both ends for the change in tariff rate are replaced with the 1st and 99th
percentile values to reduce the influence of outliers, and the results of these regressions are
in table 15. In columns 2 and 4, the level of the tariffs is also included as a control to rule
out the possibility that sectors with high profits have low tariffs already, making further
reductions unlikely. Adding this control has a very small effect on the other coefficients, so
we conclude this is not what is happening.
The coefficients on mark-up in both regressions are significant and positive in both
regressions. The positive sign on the interaction term (significant in one pair of regressions
but not the other) is a puzzle, because it says that mark-up prevents tariff reduction more
strongly in rich countries than in poor countries, which is the opposite of what we would
expect. We suspect this may be driven by nontariff barriers being the protectionist vehicle
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of choice in poor countries (Michalopoulos 1999).
Table 15: Mark-up and change in tariffs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS IV IV
Mark-up 0.178 0.188 2.774 2.782
(2.87) (2.99) (2.16) (2.18)
Log GDP per capita -0.213 -0.213 -0.251 -0.252
(-0.97) (-0.97) (-1.08) (-1.09)
Level of tariffs -0.041 -0.079
(-1.89) (-1.90)
Observations 5082 5082 5082 5082
Note: t-values in parentheses. The dependent variable
is percentage change in tariff levels, either effective
(AHS) or the rate for countries with no special agreement
(MFN). Tariff data is from UNCTAD (2013). There are
fixed effects for country, year, and sector, and the unit of
observation is a country-sector-year. Standard errors are
robust and clustered at the country level.
5.2 Management
Here we consider an alternate mechanism through which rents could depress produc-
tivity growth: lazy or satisficing managers, as in Hart (1983). We consider the hypothesis
that mark-up is driving the slower productivity growth of profitable firms by controlling
for management style and considering the effect on the measured coefficient on mark-up.
Bloom et al. (2012) conducted telephone surveys of senior managers of over 10,000 firms
in 20 countries between 2002 and 2010, asking open-ended questions and coding them
from 1 (worst) to 5. We first collapse their firm-level data to the country-sector level data.
The mean number of observations for a country-sector combination with at least one ob-
servation is under three, so we ignore temporal variation and further collapse their data to
a single management score for each country-sector.
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As our dependent variable, we use productivity growth from 2002 to 2009 (we leave
2010 out of the regression because the manufacturing data for 2010 is incomplete). The
independent variable of interest is mark-up in 2002, instrumented with mark-up in 2001, as
in our main specification. The results, reported in table 16, do not give any indication that
mark-up is merely a proxy for management style, as the estimated coefficient on mark-up
does not change substantially when we include management as a control.
This is not to say that our results call into question the results in Bloom et al. (2012)
that management practices have a substantial impact on total factor productivity or that
uncompetitive markets foster weak management. Rather, in arguing that mark-up is detri-
mental beyond its effect through the management channel, our paper should be viewed as
complementary.
Table 16: Management, mark-up and productivity growth
(1) (2) (3)
Prod. growth Prod. growth Management score
Mark-up -0.533 -0.532 0.333
(-0.28) (-0.28) (1.66)
Log GDP per capita 2.000 2.000 0.049
(6.37) (6.64) (1.06)
Management score -0.009
(-0.04)
Observations 115 115 440
R-squared 0.296 0.296 0.617
Note: t-values in parentheses. Management scores, from 1 (worst) to 5, from Bloom et al.
(2012). The dependent variable is productivity growth from 2002 to 2009. Mark-up is
measured in 2002 (instrumented with mark-up in 2001). There are fixed effects for coun-
try and sector, and the unit of observation is a country-year. Standard errors are robust
and clustered at the country level.
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6 Growth
We have found that high rents or mark-up is damaging to growth within a manufacturing
sector, and the level of mark-up in other manufacturing sectors in a country positively
predicts the level of mark-up in a manufacturing sector and negatively predicts the growth
in that sector. But manufacturing is a relatively small share of the economy, particularly
in most developing countries (Rodrik 2013). What goes on in manufacturing may have no
overall bearing on the economy at large. This may be especially the case for the formal-
sector firms that are picked up in the UNIDO data. After all, Rodrik (2013), with the same
UNIDO dataset, documents unconditional convergence in manufacturing but does not find
evidence for the rest of the economy.
However, the rent-seeking channel that this paper models and attempts to test is a po-
litical economy channel that we have no reason to believe is only expressed in formal
manufacturing. For example, protectionist measures in Liberia limit access to such sec-
tors as video clubs and tire repair shops (U.S. Department of Commerce 2012), and in the
Philippines to recruiting firms and radio stations (Werker et al. 2013).
We take a simple average of the mark-up ratios in each of the manufacturing sectors
and, using data from the WDI, include it as a control variable in the standard growth re-
gressions: a non-overlapping ordinary least squares (OLS) Barro growth regression as well
as an overlapping generalized method of moments (GMM) model. Table 17 presents the
results. The first column includes only the average mark-up and initial GDP per capita, and
the effect of the mark-up is negative and significant; the coefficient of -0.047 means a one
standard deviation decrease in average mark-up is predicted to add 0.38 percentage points
of growth. In contrast, the coefficient on initial income is essentially zero, consistent with
a lack of unconditional convergence in the sample. The next column includes mark-up as
well as some of the usual suspects in the growth regressions: government spending, school
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enrollment, population growth, and life expectancy. These are chosen to follow the regres-
sors used by Bekaert et al. (2005), who in turn is following Barro (1997), all with the aim of
reducing the possibility of data-mining. With the other controls in column 2, the coefficient
on initial income is now negative and significant, consistent with conditional convergence.
The coefficient on mark-up remains statistically significant and almost unchanged in size at
-0.049, meaning a one standard deviation decrease in average mark-up leads to a 0.39 per-
centage point improvement in GDP growth. Among the other variables, population growth
is significant and negative, and life expectancy is positive. In four additional unreported
regressions, we included one of the four control variables along with mark-up, and mark-
up remains statistically significant in all cases, with a a coefficient ranging from -0.038 to
-0.054.
The growth penalty from a one standard deviation increase in mark-up is about half
of the growth advantage from a one standard deviation reduction in GDP, indicating that
the benefits of catch-up growth from being poor are larger than the costs of having a bad
political economy. Column 3 includes an interaction term between mark-up and initial
income to test whether the effect of rents is worse for growth in poorer countries. The
coefficient is positive, suggesting that the effect may be worse in poor countries, but the
coefficient is imprecisely measured.
Columns 4 and 5 are similar to 2 and 3, except we use GMM, following Caselli, Es-
quivel, and Lefort (1996). OLS estimates may be inconsistent due to correlated individual
effects and endogenous explanatory variables, for which the method in Caselli, Esquivel,
and Lefort (1996) (and used by many researchers since then) is designed to correct. The
results are very similar to the OLS. The countries exhibit conditional convergence, with
a negative and significant coefficient on initial wealth. The effect of the average mark-
up remains negative and significant. The interaction term between wealth and mark-up in
column 2 is also positive but statistically insignificant.
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Table 17: GDP growth and mark-up: non-overlapping OLS and overlapping GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS OLS OLS GMM GMM
Average mark-up -0.047 -0.049 -0.050 -0.044 -0.044
(-2.63) (-2.45) (-2.45) (-2.59) (-2.60)
Initial log GDP pc 0.001 -0.006 -0.006 -0.004 -0.004
(0.78) (-3.10) (-3.06) (-2.45) (-2.36)
Gov spending/GDP -0.145 -0.121 -0.203 -0.191
(-0.52) (-0.41) (-0.84) (-0.78)
Sec school enrollment -0.010 -0.015 -0.001 -0.000
(-0.09) (-0.14) (-0.01) (-0.00)
Population growth -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
(-1.98) (-2.12) (-2.35) (-2.39)
Log life expectancy 0.057 0.058 0.046 0.046
(2.49) (2.52) (2.18) (2.19)
Avg mark-up x log GDP pc 0.014 0.011
(0.88) (0.78)
Observations 420 326 326 1586 1586
R-squared 0.023 0.087 0.090 0.069 0.071
Note: t-values in parentheses. See text for sources. The dependent vari-
able is growth in GDP per capita. In the first three columns, we consider
non-overlapping 5-year periods, and use OLS. In the last two, we consider
overlapping 5-year periods with GMM. There are no fixed effects. Stan-
dard errors are robust and clustered at the country level.
Taken together, these results suggest that the rents we measure in the manufacturing
sector may be indicative of an overall environment in which incumbents rent-seek to pre-
vent challengers, which lowers the overall growth of the economy. Whether or not we
control for initial income, countries in which businesses are able to maintain high profit
margins grow slower, in spite of the fact that these countries might otherwise enjoy some
of the “advantages of backwardness” (Gerschenkron 1962) consistent with a lower level
of economic development. Of course income and mark-up are inversely correlated. That
higher mark-ups are more prevalent in poor countries may explain why convergence has
89
not generally been a feature of economic development (Pritchett 1997). We find that devel-
oping countries are both poor (which provides a growth boost, once some other factors are
controlled for) but also have a higher mark-up, indicative of a worse political economy of
business (which provides a growth drag).
It may be the case, as suggested in North et al. (2012, p. 9), that many non-converging
developing countries are politically “held together” by their rents even as those same rents
prevent them from generating prosperity for their non-elites. Indeed, North, Wallis, and
Weingast (2009) argue that rents are useful for political stability whereas we have restricted
our attention to productivity and economic growth as outcome variables that proxy for wel-
fare. We re-ran the analysis in table 17 but with political stability as the outcome variable.
The results (available from the authors on request) are inconclusive: the coefficient of the
association between mark-up and political stability appears to be slightly positive when in-
come per capita is under $1000, and otherwise negative, but the standard errors are so large
that they do not rule out the opposite result.
7 Conclusion
This paper has attempted to test the question of whether rents are good for develop-
ment—brought to the forefront of scholarship and policy by North, Wallis, and Weingast
(2009)—by using a rich dataset on manufacturing sectors and applying the methods from
the competition-and-growth literature of Aghion and co-authors. While the results can-
not be seen as incontrovertible due to the challenges of endogeneity and the presence of
a strong alternative hypothesis (management) that cannot be discounted completely, the
evidence all points in one direction.
Rents, as measured by a high-markup which is also an indication of low competition,
seem to slow growth in productivity or output. The effect is strongest in poor countries.
Higher rents are associated with a slower removal of tariffs, indicative of the channel in
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our model: firms rent-seek to prevent competition and maintain their high margins. This
investment in rent-seeking may be in lieu of investment in innovation or new productive
assets, which slows the overall growth of the sector. In industries in which high profits
should be essential in generating growth, those sectors that would otherwise need external
finance but in a country with weak financial markets, the negative impact of rents on growth
is especially strong. We do not find evidence (although our data availability is limited) to
support the alternative hypothesis most consistent with the data, that sectors with higher
rents have inefficient managers. Finally, we find that countries with more rents in the
manufacturing sector grow slower, even when other controls are introduced.
Ideally, this paper would have looked at other measures of rents, or excess profits, like
return on assets and return on equity. Unfortunately, the data coverage for these variables is
much weaker, particularly across time in the less developed countries which are our focus
in this paper. That said, this remains an avenue for future work. Another important research
question that this paper leaves unanswered is what allows a country to be able to escape
from an equilibrium of limited but non-expanding profits (Pritchett and Werker 2012).
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Appendix C
Table C1: Country coverage
Country Years First Last Country Years First Last
Albania 9 2001 2009 Denmark 38 1964 2008
Algeria 23 1968 1995 Dominican Republic 20 1964 1983
Argentina 13 1985 2001 Ecuador 44 1964 2007
Armenia 3 2005 2007 Egypt, Arab Rep. 24 1965 1988
Australia 26 1964 1989 El Salvador 4 1994 1997
Austria 40 1964 2008 Eritrea 17 1993 2009
Azerbaijan 8 2002 2009 Estonia 14 1996 2009
Bahamas, The 9 1978 1997 Ethiopia 18 1991 2008
Bangladesh 24 1968 1991 Fiji 29 1971 2008
Barbados 21 1976 1996 Finland 43 1964 2008
Belarus 4 2006 2009 France 28 1978 2008
Belgium 39 1964 2008 Gabon 3 1992 1994
Belize 1 1991 1991 Gambia, The 6 1976 1981
Benin 6 1975 1980 Georgia 4 2006 2009
Bolivia 28 1971 2000 Germany 10 1999 2008
Botswana 18 1982 2009 Greece 8 1993 2006
Brazil 4 1993 2009 Guatemala 15 1973 1987
Bulgaria 15 1992 2009 Hong Kong 21 1981 2009
Burkina Faso 8 1975 1982 Hungary 41 1964 2008
Burundi 12 1972 1990 Iceland 7 1989 1995
Cameroon 10 1971 1983 India 25 1980 2008
Canada 46 1964 2009 Indonesia 35 1971 2008
Central Afr. Rep. 13 1974 1992 Iran, Islamic Rep. 40 1966 2008
Chile 44 1964 2007 Ireland 38 1971 2008
China 8 1981 2006 Israel 36 1964 2002
Colombia 46 1964 2009 Italy 41 1968 2008
Costa Rica 19 1984 2002 Jamaica 19 1967 1991
Cuba 11 1978 1988 Japan 41 1964 2009
Cyprus 34 1976 2009 Jordan 30 1976 2009
Czech Republic 11 1996 2006 Kenya 38 1972 2009
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Table C1 (cont.)
Country Years First Last Country Years First Last
Kuwait 9 1996 2009 Romania 19 1991 2009
Kyrgyz Republic 9 2001 2009 Russian Federation 12 1994 2009
Latvia 16 1994 2009 Senegal 17 1975 2001
Lesotho 3 1982 1984 Singapore 22 1964 2007
Lithuania 9 2001 2009 Slovak Republic 13 1994 2006
Luxembourg 20 1986 2008 Slovenia 19 1991 2009
Macao SAR, China 13 1983 1995 South Africa 21 1980 2008
Macedonia, FYR 16 1991 2009 Spain 45 1964 2008
Madagascar 22 1968 2005 Sri Lanka 11 1993 2009
Malawi 33 1968 2008 Suriname 7 1997 2003
Malaysia 38 1969 2009 Swaziland 15 1980 1994
Malta 34 1971 2007 Sweden 45 1964 2008
New Zealand 15 1978 2008 Syrican Arab Rep. 1 1994 1994
Nicaragua 19 1966 1984 Tanzania 10 1995 2009
Niger 3 1999 2001 Thailand 5 1969 1990
Nigeria 22 1964 1995 Trinidad & Tobago 21 1967 2002
Norway 44 1964 2007 Tunisia 26 1964 2001
Oman 16 1994 2009 Turkey 42 1964 2008
Pakistan 27 1964 1990 Ukraine 2 2002 2003
Panama 28 1964 2000 United Kingdom 38 1969 2006
Papua New Guinea 23 1964 1986 United States 39 1964 2007
Philippines 32 1964 1998 Uruguay 11 1977 1987
Poland 10 1991 2008 Venezuela, RB 23 1974 1996
Portugal 9 2000 2008 Vietnam 1 2007 2007
Puerto Rico 10 1990 1999 Yemen, Rep. 4 1999 2005
Qatar 3 2001 2003 Zambia 12 1964 1981
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Table C2: Alternate fixed effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Mark-up -0.202 -0.242 -0.640 -0.307 -0.170
(-6.44) (-8.57) (-9.29) (-9.78) (-6.02)
Mark-up x log GDP 0.045 0.059 0.112 0.037 0.037
(2.14) (2.61) (2.30) (1.82) (1.78)
Log GDP per capita -0.006 -0.030 -0.036 -0.005
(-2.30) (-1.31) (-1.56) (-1.75)
Country FE No Yes No No No
Sector FE Yes No No Yes No
Year FE Yes Yes Yes No No
Country-sector FE No No Yes No No
Country-year FE No No No Yes No
Observations 35031 35031 35031 35031 35031
R-squared 0.086 0.110 0.173 0.340 0.019
Note: t-values in parentheses. Productivity growth is measured from
time t  1 to t. We instrument for mark-up in t  1 with mark-up
in t 2. The unit of observation is a country-sector-year. Standard
errors are robust and clustered at the country level.
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Table C3: Alternate variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Prod. Prod. VA VA 5-yr Prod.
Mark-up -0.314 -0.343 -0.325 -0.346 -0.265
(-9.60) (-7.58) (-10.46) (-8.01) (-7.80)
Log GDP per capita -0.031 -0.054 -0.065
(-1.39) (-1.98) (-1.98)
Mark-up x log GDP 0.058 0.082 0.068
(2.71) (3.63) (3.24)
Political stability 0.000 -0.002
(0.10) (-1.78)
Mark-up x pol. stab. 0.004 0.008
(1.34) (2.88)
Observations 35031 17789 41816 21057 5799
R-squared 0.119 0.131 0.118 0.125 0.248
Note: t-values in parentheses. The dependent variables (productivity and
value added growth) are measured from time t  1 to t. We instrument
for mark-up in t 1 with mark-up in t 2. In the fifth column, produc-
tivity growth is annualized growth from t 1 to t+4 (non-overlapping).
The unit of observation is a country-sector-year. Political stabilty is
ICRG’s "political risk rating," with high numbers representing stronger
political systems (PRS Group, 2012). There are fixed effects for coun-
try, year, and sector. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the
country level.
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Table C4: Other robustness checks
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Less MN Drop small Less traded Cap exp.
Mark-up -0.291 -0.315 -0.265 -0.203
(-8.79) (-9.37) (-7.96) (-5.29)
Mark-up x log GDP 0.062 0.054 0.053 0.076
(2.84) (2.31) (2.48) (3.78)
Log GDP per capita -0.030 -0.028 -0.033 -0.041
(-1.14) (-1.19) (-1.37) (-1.70)
Observations 31702 27454 17499 18451
R-squared 0.119 0.121 0.111 0.119
Note: t-values in parentheses. The dependent variable, productivity
growth is measured from time t 1 to t. We instrument for mark-up in
t 1 with mark-up in t 2. The unit of observation is a country-sector-
year. In column one we remove the four sectors with the highest multi-
national presence. In column two we drop the smallest 10% of coun-
tries. In column three we consider the less traded sectors. In column
four we redefine mark-up by subtracting a five-year moving average of
capital expenditures. The unit of observation is a country-sector-year.
There are fixed effects for country, year, and sector. Standard errors
are robust and clustered at the country level.
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How Do Aid Inflows Affect the 
Likelihood of Conflict in Poor 
Countries? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter is based on work with Faisal Ahmed and Eric Werker. 
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Does foreign aid promote peace in the country that receives it? In most of the 
theoretical and empirical literature, scholars have found foreign aid generates civil 
conflict, similar to a natural resource curse. On the other hand, Ahmed, Schwab, and 
Werker (2016) present empirical evidence that autocrats who receive foreign aid can use 
the additional resources to hold on to power, and deter insurgencies. This result runs 
counter to the predictions of the model in Besley and Persson (2009). In this chapter, we 
extend that model to accommodate the possibility that foreign aid prevents civil conflict. 
In Besley and Persson (2009), when a state has a low level of resources1 it will be 
at peace, when it has an intermediate level of resources there will be repression, and at a 
high level of resources there will be two-sided civil conflict. The extension presented in 
this chapter to that model is to allow the incumbents to choose between two different 
levels of violence in response to an insurgency. This creates a new possible ordering of 
outcomes, which is that as aid moves from zero to infinity, the recipient experiences 
peace, then repression, then civil conflict (as in the Besley-Persson model), but then a 
reversal back to repression, and then civil conflict again.  
The intuition behind the result is that increasing the amount of aid a country 
receives has two effects. The first is that it makes the prize for a successful insurgency 
larger. The second is that it may provide the resources necessary for the incumbents to 
respond to an insurgency with a greater level of violence, which deters insurgency. The 
reversal back to repression from civil conflict occurs because the incumbent has 
                                                
1"These"resources"can"come"from"aid,"natural"resources,"or"other"sources."
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sufficient incentive to use the maximum response. As aid grows even larger and the prize 
of holding power rises, the first effect will dominate the second, and the opposition will 
mount an insurgency even though it will face the most violent response. 
In Ahmed, Schwab, and Werker (2016), we argue that foreign aid decreases civil 
conflict, and raises repression. This finding suggests that in the ranges of aid that we 
observe, the first effect dominates, meaning that the increased resources available to the 
state primarily serve to deter insurgency. 
There is a rich theoretical literature on the economic causes of civil conflict, 
where the opposition attempts a coup if expected benefits exceed expected costs; 
Grossman (1995) and Collier and Hoeffler (1998) are seminal contributions. More 
specifically, there has been a focus on the relationship between civil conflict and  
unearned income from aid or natural resources.2  
Collier and Hoeffler (2000) and Morrison (2007) present models where additional 
resources create civil conflict by increasing the value of power. This is analogous to the 
ordering of violence outcomes as in Besley and Persson (2009), where there is no 
possibility of non-monotonic relationship between aid and violence. The ability of the 
incumbents using aid revenues for the purpose of political repression is a common feature 
in models of aid and political outcomes. In Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2009), aid can 
be used to prevent the opposition from protesting, which increases the incumbent’s 
probability of holding power. 
                                                
2 Feyzioglu et al. (1998) and Morrison (2007) show that wealth from foreign aid and natural resources has 
many of the same properties. 
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Section 2 sets up the model, and section 3 characterizes agents’ optimal strategies. 
Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Model Set-up 
 
 The model closely follows Besley and Persson (2009). There are two groups of 
equal size in a population normalized to 1 with wage w. Time is infinite, though since 
there are no state variables we model a single generation which is equivalent to any other. 
One group, the incumbent (denoted Inc) is in power, while the other group (Opp) is in the 
opposition. Being in power allows the incumbent to favor its own when distributing state 
resources R which can be thought of as a rentier’s unearned income from natural 
resources and aid. The incumbent is restricted in how much it can favor its own 
population: when it gives a transfer of 1 to its own population, it must give σ ɛ [0,1] to 
the other group. This results in per capita transfers of rInc and rOpp. Utility for both groups 
are described in VInc and VOpp. 
Both the incumbent and the opposition have access to a violence technology: the 
incumbent can raise an army from the state’s resources, while the opposition can mount 
an insurgency financed by its own members’ income. An army of size A ɛ (0,1) costs wA 
to raise. For simplicity, we assume that there are two sizes of armies available for the 
incumbents (low and high) and one for the opposition ALInc, AHInc, and ALOpp. Power 
changes hands stochastically with probability ɣ, but either side can improve their chances 
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by investing in violence so ɣ(AOpp, AInc) ɛ (0, 1) which ensures that no one is assured of 
winning or losing. The value of the prize for the group in power is equal to Z = R / w. 
 The timing at any generation is as follows: 
1. Group I starts in power.  
2. R and w are realized. 
3. Group O chooses violence level 0 or ALOpp. 
4. Group I observes this, chooses violence level 0, ALInc, or AHInc.  
5. A new incumbent, I’, is chosen according to the conflict function.  
6. Group I’ chooses the level of transfers. 
7. Payoffs are realized and the current generation dies.  
 
We make several other simplifying assumptions. More violence always improves a 
group’s probability of taking or holding power, or ɣ(0, AInc) < ɣ(ALOpp, AInc), and ɣ(AOpp, 
0) > ɣ(AOpp, ALInc) > ɣ(AOpp, AHInc) for all AOpp, AInc. Opposition violence is never 
undefended, so if AOpp = ALOpp, then AInc > 0. Opposition and incumbent break ties by 
choosing the lower level of violence. 
 
 
Investing in Violence 
The government has total resources R, which it spends on transfers to the two 
groups rInc’ and rOpp’ (whose identities are determined by the violence function), and the 
incumbent’s army AInc, so its budget constraint is: 
 102 
 
R – rInc’ /2 – rOpp’ /2 – wAInc ≥ 0  (1) 
 
Since the incumbent is restricted in the degree to which it can favor its own group, giving 
σ ɛ [0,1] to the other group for every 1 transferred to its own, and assuming that the 
government budget constraint holds with equality, we have: 
 
rInc’ = 2(1 – Ɵ)[R - wAInc]  (2) 
 
where, for convenience, Ɵ = σ / (1 + σ) ɛ [0, ½]. 
To keep the model as simple as possible, utility is equal to consumption,3 which is 
wages plus transfers. The expected payoff to the incumbent is then: 
 
VInc(w, R; AOpp, AInc) = w + [(1 – Ɵ) – ɣ(AOpp, AInc)(1 – 2 Ɵ)] 2 [R – wAInc]  (3) 
 
The term [(1 – Ɵ) – ɣ(AOpp, AInc)(1 – 2 Ɵ)] represents the share of the end-of-period 
transfers that the incumbent expects to get. If the incumbent retains power, they receive a 
share of (1 – Ɵ) of transfers while if they lose power they receive a share of Ɵ, meaning 
the amount they lose is (1 – 2 Ɵ), and that occurs with probability ɣ(AOpp, AInc). The 
opposition’s expected payoff is similar, with the primary difference that they have to fund 
their own violence from their wages: 
                                                
3 See below for a discussion of the ramifications of relaxing the assumption of linear utility.  
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VOpp(w, R; AOpp, AInc) = w(1 – AOpp) + [Ɵ + ɣ(AOpp, AInc)(1 – 2 Ɵ)] 2 [R – wAInc]      (4) 
 
This allows us to define the groups’ optimal actions. Working backwards from the 
end of a period, the incumbent chooses the violence level:  
 
ÂInc = argmax VInc(w, R; AOpp, AInc) for AInc ɛ {0, ALInc, AHInc }  (5) 
 
Because of the timing, AOpp has been chosen earlier and are known to the incumbent, and 
we assume that if AOpp ≠ 0 then ÂInc ≠ 0. We define ÂInc(0) and ÂInc(ALInc) as the levels of 
violence that the incumbent will choose in response to levels of violence 0 and ALInc from 
the opposition. The opposition, chooses its optimal level of violence: 
 
ÂOpp = argmax VOpp(w, R; AOpp, ÂInc(AOpp)) for AOpp ɛ {0, ALInc}  (6) 
 
Commitment and Timing 
 As in the Besley-Persson models, violence is created by the incumbents’ inability 
to commit to share resources more equally. If the two groups were able to write 
enforceable contracts, then in equilibrium there would always be peace, because violence 
wastes resources. In terms of the steps above, there is no time before the opposition 
chooses violence in step 3 where the incumbent can credibly promise transfers to the 
opposition in exchange for peace. Additionally, the incumbent cannot credibly commit to 
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using the highest level of violence in response to an insurgency if that response would not 
be optimal ex post.4  
 
3. Characterizing Optimal Investment in Violence 
Recall that Z = R / w is a measure of the prize for having power, normalized for 
convenience by w. We define ZInc(AOpp; A1Inc, A2Inc) as the threshold level of Z in which 
the incumbent is indifferent between investing between any two of violence A1Inc and 
A2Inc given that the opposition is investing AOpp. First we solve for the incumbent’s 
optimal investment in violence as the prize gets larger.  
 
Proposition 1: There exist thresholds for Z that determine ÂInc(0) and ÂInc(ALOpp), the 
optimal incumbent violence against peace and violence, respectively. The thresholds 
satisfy either (i): 
 
1) ÂInc(0) = 0 if Z ≤ ZInc(0; 0, ALInc), so ZInc(0; 0, ALInc) is the threshold where the 
incumbent is indifferent between using 0 violence and ALInc, given that the 
opposition is using 0. 
2) ÂInc(0) = ALInc if ZInc(0; 0, ALInc) < Z ≤ ZInc(0; 0, AHInc) 
3) ÂInc(0) = AHInc if Z > ZInc(0; 0, AHInc) 
 
                                                
4 For example, we assume that it is not possible for the incumbents to purchase military equipment that 
would decrease its marginal cost of future military operations. Such a model would be plausible, but it 
would add additional complexity. 
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or (ii): 
 
1) ÂInc(0) = 0 if Z ≤ ZInc(0; 0, AHInc) 
2) ÂInc(0) ≠ ALInc for all Z 
3) ÂInc(0) = AHInc if Z > ZInc(0; 0, AHInc)  
 
In addition, (iii) is always satisfied: 
 
4) ÂInc(ALOpp) = ALInc if Z ≤ ZInc(ALOpp; ALInc, AHInc)  
5) ÂInc(ALOpp) = AHInc if Z > ZInc(ALOpp; ALInc, AHInc)  
 
Case (i) means that as Z goes from zero to infinity, the incumbent’s optimal response to 
peace will be peace, then low violence, then high violence. Case (ii) means that the 
incumbent never wants to use low violence against peace; it’s always better to use peace 
or high violence. Either case is possible depending on the parameters. The thresholds (iii) 
mean that as Z goes from zero to infinity, the incumbent’s optimal response to violence 
will be low violence, then high violence.  
Proof: See Appendix D. 
 
Next we solve for the opposition’s optimal investment in violence as the prize Z 
gets larger. 
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Proposition 2: For all Z ≠ ZInc(ALOpp; ALInc, AHInc), ÂOpp is non-decreasing in Z.  
This means that as the prize gets larger, the opposition will switch from peace to 
insurgency. There is one exception in which the opposition’s optimal strategy may switch 
back to peace, however, even as Z grows. At the exact Z when the incumbent is 
indifferent between using high and low violence, the opposition—mounting an 
insurgency to combat a low investment of violence by the incumbent—chooses to revert 
to peace since the higher investment in violence by the incumbent reduces the likelihood 
that the opposition could win. From that particular point of Z on up, the opposition may 
then choose again to mount an insurgency even against a large investment in violence by 
the incumbent once the prize got attractive enough. 
Proof: See Appendix D. 
 
The Consequences of Aid Inflows 
 In this subsection, we articulate what may happen when aid arrives in another 
fragile state. Besley and Persson (2011a) model a potential hierarchy of violence from 
peace via repression to civil war as unearned income rises, and find broad support for 
their prediction in cross-country data using quasi-experimental methods. In our extended 
model, we find that it is possible to observe low levels of aid leading to low-investment 
civil war and higher levels of aid leading to repression. These are not necessarily the most 
likely outcomes, but there are nonetheless reasonable conditions within the model in 
which such an ordering might occur. 
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Proposition 3: In order to observe civil conflict for ZL and repression for ZH > ZL, the 
following conditions are necessary and sufficient: 
 
1) ZH > min { ZInc(0; 0, ALInc), ZInc(0; 0, AHInc)} 
2) ZL > ((ALOpp / 2) + [Ɵ + ɣ(ALOpp, ÂInc(ALOpp))(1 – 2Ɵ)] ÂInc(ALOpp) – [Ɵ + ɣ(0, 
ÂInc(0))(1 – 2Ɵ)] ÂInc(0)) / ((1 – 2Ɵ)(ɣ(ALOpp, ÂInc(ALOpp)) – ɣ(0, ÂInc(0)))) ≡ ZT(ZL) 
3) ZH < ((ALOpp / 2) + [Ɵ + ɣ(ALOpp, ÂInc(ALOpp))(1 – 2Ɵ)] ÂInc(ALOpp) – [Ɵ + ɣ(0, 
ÂInc(0))(1 – 2Ɵ)] ÂInc(0)) / ((1 – 2Ɵ)(ɣ(ALOpp, ÂInc(ALOpp)) – ɣ(0, ÂInc(0)))) ≡ ZT(ZH) 
 
The first condition means that the incumbent will invest in violence against a 
peaceful opposition for sufficiently high Z, which is the definition of repression. The 
second and third conditions say that the opposition will mount an insurgency against a 
poor incumbent (low Z), but be peaceful against a rich incumbent (high Z). This situation 
is realized when the poor incumbent can only afford to invest in a small army, which 
means violence pays for the opposition, but the rich incumbent can finance a large army, 
so the opposition would have little chance of winning the state through violence and 
would prefer to receive transfers instead. 
Proof: see Appendix D. Appendix D also describes some values over which these 
conditions are maintained. We note the right-hand side of conditions (2) and (3) are 
algebraically the same, but evaluated at the different Zs, so have different values. 
  
4. Conclusion 
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This chapter has argued for the theoretical possibility that receiving aid may 
reduce the likelihood of an insurgency, and the withdrawal of this aid leads to civil 
conflict. We put forward a simple model that makes that prediction, and the purpose of 
this chapter is to present a theoretical model consistent with the empirical results found in 
Ahmed, Schwab, and Werker (2016). 
 
Appendix D 
 
Proof of Proposition 1: 
Proof. To determine when peace is a better response to peace than low violence, we 
compare the utility functions for the two. AInc(0) = 0 is preferred to AInc(0) = ALInc if 
VInc(w, R; 0, 0) ≥ VInc(w, R; 0, ALInc), which is equivalent to:  
 
[(1 – Ɵ) – ɣ(0,0)(1 – 2Ɵ)][Z – 0] ≥ [(1-Ɵ) – ɣ(0, ALInc)(1 – 2Ɵ)][Z – ALInc] 
 
or 
 
Z ≤ [(1 – Ɵ) – ɣ((0, ALInc)(1-2Ɵ)] ALInc / [(1 – 2Ɵ)(ɣ(0,0) – ɣ(0, ALInc))] ≡ ZInc(0; 0, ALInc). 
 
Similarly, peace is a better response to peace than high violence (i.e., AInc(0) = 0 is 
preferred to AInc(0) = AHInc) if  
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Z ≤ [(1 – Ɵ) – ɣ((0, AHInc)(1 – 2Ɵ)] AHInc / [(1 – 2Ɵ)(ɣ(0,0) – ɣ(0, AHInc))] ≡ ZInc(0; 0, 
AHInc). 
 
Note that a higher level is always preferred by the incumbent for a sufficiently 
high Z and a lower level of violence is always preferred for a sufficiently low Z, and there 
is never switching back and forth between violence levels as Z increases (holding 
opposition violence constant). Thus, peace is the best response to peace if both conditions 
are met, or ÂInc(0) = 0 if  
 
Z ≤ min { ZInc(0; 0, ALInc), ZInc(0; 0, AHInc)}  (*) 
 
If the first threshold in (*) is less than or equal to the second, then there exist value(s) of 
Z for which ÂInc(0) = ALInc. This would be true because the threshold for switching to high 
violence is higher than the threshold for switching to low violence, which is labeled case 
(i). If that is the case, then high violence is the optimal response against peace (i.e., 
ÂInc(0) = AHInc) whenever AInc(0) = AHInc is preferred to AInc(0) = ALInc (which will imply 
that it is preferred to ÂInc(0) = 0). This happens when  
 
Z > ZInc(0; ALInc, AHInc) ≡ 
([(1 – Ɵ) – ɣ(0, AHInc)(1-2Ɵ)] AHInc – [(1 – Ɵ) – ɣ(0, ALInc)(1-2Ɵ)]ALInc / [(1 – 2Ɵ)(ɣ(0, 
ALInc) – ɣ(0, AHInc))]. 
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When ZInc(0; 0, ALInc) < Z < ZInc(0; 0, AHInc), low violence is the best response to peace (so 
ÂInc(0) = ALInc). This covers case (i).  
If the second expression in (*) is larger, then ÂInc(0) ≠ ALInc for all Z. The reason 
this happens is that as Z increases from zero, it passes the threshold which makes high 
violence desirable against peace before it passes the threshold that makes low violence 
desirable. As Z continues to get larger, high violence continues to be more attractive by a 
greater margin over low violence. Up to ZInc(0; 0, AHInc), ÂInc(0) = 0, and then above 
ZInc(0; 0, AHInc), ÂInc(0) = AHInc, which is case (ii). 
The analysis of ÂInc(ALOpp) is simpler, because we have assumed that it is 
impossible to have an undefended insurgency. Following the same logic as above, the 
optimal response against opposition violence is to use high violence (i.e., ÂInc(ALOpp) = 
AHInc) if  
 
Z > ZInc(ALOpp; ALInc, AHInc) ≡  
([(1 – Ɵ) – ɣ(ALOpp, AHInc)(1 – 2Ɵ)] AHInc –  [(1 – Ɵ) – ɣ(ALOpp, ALInc)(1-2Ɵ)] ALInc / [(1 – 
2Ɵ)(ɣ(ALInc, ALInc) – ɣ(ALInc, AHInc))].  
 
Thus, holding the opposition violence constant, incumbent violence is non-
decreasing in Z, and we can pinpoint the threshold at which violence changes. Also, for 
sufficiently low values of Z, the optimal response to peace is peace and the optimal 
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response to violence is the lower level of violence. For sufficiently high values of Z, the 
optimal response is high violence.□ 
  
Proof of Proposition 2: 
Proof. ZInc(ALOpp; ALInc, AHInc) is the level of Z at which the incumbent is indifferent 
between using high and low violence, given that the opposition uses violence. If Z moves 
above ZInc(ALOpp; ALInc, AHInc), then suddenly opposition violence will be met with high 
violence, and this is the only value of Z where an increase in Z can cause opposition 
violence to become unattractive.  
Consider Z1 and Z2, with Z1 < Z2 and ZInc(ALOpp; ALInc, AHInc) not ɛ [Z1, Z2]. We 
define ÂOpp(Zj) as the optimal violence for the opposition given Z = Zj and ÂInc(ÂOpp(Zj)) 
to be the corresponding violence level for the incumbent. Since we are trying to show that 
ÂOpp is non-decreasing, we can assume that ÂOpp(Z1) = ALOpp (otherwise it is trivially non-
decreasing), and it is sufficient to show that ÂOpp(Z2) = ALOpp. We define ÂOpp(AIncpeace, 
AIncfight) as the opposition’s optimal violence given that the incumbent will use AIncpeace if 
the opposition uses zero violence and AIncfight > 0 if they use ALOpp. We are interested in 
characterizing when the opposition will choose violence, given that the incumbent 
responds optimally—that is, when AOpp(ÂInc(0), ÂInc(ALOpp)) = ALOpp is preferred to 
AOpp(ÂInc(0), ÂInc(ALOpp)) = 0. This holds when the opposition’s utility is higher under 
violence, VOpp(w, R; D, 0, ÂInc(0)) < VOpp(w, R; D, ALOpp, ÂInc(ALOpp)). Note that the 
opposition would never use violence when ɣ(ALOpp, ÂInc(ALOpp)) ≤ ɣ(0, ÂInc(0)), because 
then using violence would not increase their chances of coming to power. Substituting in 
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for the utility function, the opposition uses violence when ɣ(ALOpp, ÂInc(ALOpp)) > ɣ(0, 
ÂInc(0)) and 
 
(1 – 0) + [Ɵ + ɣ(0, ÂInc(0))(1 – 2Ɵ)] 2 [Z – ÂInc(0)] < (1 – ALOpp) + [Ɵ + ɣ(ALOpp, 
ÂInc(ALOpp))(1 – 2Ɵ)] 2 [Z – ÂInc(ALOpp)] 
 
or 
 
Z > ((ALOpp / 2) + [Ɵ + ɣ(ALOpp, ÂInc(ALOpp))(1 – 2Ɵ)] ÂInc(ALOpp) – [Ɵ + ɣ(0, ÂInc(0))(1 – 
2Ɵ)] ÂInc(0)) / ((1 – 2Ɵ)(ɣ(ALOpp, ÂInc(ALOpp)) – ɣ(0, ÂInc(0)))) ≡ ZT(Z)            (**) 
 
Note that ZT is itself a function of Z, because the values of ÂInc(0) and ÂInc(ALOpp) depend 
on Z. By assumption, AOpp(ÂInc(0), ÂInc(ALOpp)) = ALOpp is optimal when Z = Z1, so the 
inequality (**) holds at Z1. By the previous proposition, if Z is increased to Z2, it must be 
the case that neither ÂInc(0) nor ÂInc(ALOpp) has decreased because both expressions are 
nondecreasing in Z. Also, ÂInc(ALOpp) has not increased because we have not crossed over 
ZInc(ALOpp; ALInc, AHInc), the only value for which ÂInc(ALOpp) can increase. Thus, 
ÂInc(ALOpp) has not changed, and neither has ɣ(ALOpp, ÂInc(ALOpp)). ÂInc(0) has increased or 
stayed the same, which implies that ɣ(0, ÂInc(0)) has decreased or stayed the same 
because ɣ (the probability of power changing hands) is decreasing in the second 
argument (incumbent violence). If ÂInc(0) increases, the direct effect is to cause the 
threshold in (**) ZT to get smaller, and if ɣ(0, ÂInc(0)) decreases, that also causes the 
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threshold to get smaller (because the denominator increases). Therefore, increasing Z 
from Z1 to Z2 does not increase ZT, so if the inequality in (**) is satisfied at Z1 then it must 
also be satisfied at Z2, and opposition violence is nondecreasing. □  
 
 
Proof of Proposition 3: 
Proof. The first condition is the simplest; it says that with a high value for Z, the 
incumbent will use violence against a peaceful opposition, which is the definition of 
repression. In the proof of Proposition 1, (*) tells us the condition for when peace is the 
optimal response to peace, and condition 1 is the same, but with the opposite inequality. 
The second condition says that the opposition will use violence with Z = ZL, and the third 
says that the opposition will use peace with Z = ZH. This is the same condition as (**) in 
Proposition 2 to determine the opposition’s choice of violence. We note that the right-
hand side of conditions 2 and 3 are the same expression, but they are evaluated for Z = ZL 
in the second condition and Z = ZH in the third, so they have different values.  
For example, ÂInc(ALOpp), which represents the optimal incumbent violence given 
a violent opposition, must be ALInc for Z = ZL and AHInc for Z = ZH. We can pin down those 
values since Proposition 2 tells us that for all Z ≠ ZInc(ALOpp; ALInc, AHInc), ÂOpp is non-
decreasing in Z. ÂOpp does increase as we increase Z from ZL to ZH, so we must have ZL ≤ 
ZInc(ALOpp; ALInc, AHInc) < ZH. By conditions 4 and 5 from proposition 1, ÂInc(ALOpp) = ALInc 
for Z = ZL and ÂInc(ALOpp) = AHInc for Z = ZH, so the three conditions above are satisfied if 
and only if ZL leads to civil conflict and ZH leads to repression. □  
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We can verify that some reasonable values of the parameters generate this result.. 
In general, Z = R / w, so ZL = RL / w and ZH = RH / w. We consider an example where a 
low R causes both groups to use low violence because it is cheap, and a high R means 
that an incumbent will use high violence in response to opposition violence, which deters 
the opposition and causes one-sided violence. 
We want to show that it is possible ZL satisfies 
 
1) ZL ɛ (ZInc(0; 0, ALInc), ZInc(0; 0, AHInc)), 
2) ZL < ZInc(ALOpp; ALInc, AHInc), and 
3) ÂOpp = ALOpp 
 
and ZH satisfies  
 
4) ZH > ZInc(ALOpp; ALInc, AHInc) 
5) ZH ɛ (ZInc(0; 0, ALInc), ZInc(0; 0, AHInc)) 
6) ÂOpp = 0  
 
Conditions 1 and 2 mean that for ZL the incumbents will use low violence against ALOpp or 
against peace, so ÂInc(0) = ÂInc(ALOpp) = ALInc. Condition 3 says for ZL the opposition will 
use violence. Conditions 4 and 5 say that the opposition will use high violence against 
ALOpp and low violence against peace, and that the opposition will choose peace. 
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ZInc(0; 0, ALInc) is the threshold where the incumbent facing a peaceful opposition 
is indifferent between using low violence (ALInc) and peace (higher Z implies higher 
violence). ZInc(0; 0, ALInc) will be sufficiently low if ALInc is low and (ɣ(0, 0) – ɣ(0, ALInc)) 
is not too low, meaning that low violence is very cheap and yields a significantly 
improved chance of holding power. ZInc(0; 0, AHInc), the threshold between using high 
violence and low violence against peace, can be very high. Specifically, suppose that AH-
Inc
 is high, and (ɣ(0, ALInc) – ɣ(0, AHInc)) is very low, meaning that high violence is very 
expensive and barely improves the incumbent’s prospects, so ZInc(0; 0, AHInc) is very 
high. These values guarantee that the incumbent will use low violence against a peaceful 
opposition, satisfying condition 1. The thresholds in condition 1 can be arbitrarily low 
and high, so it is simple to choose a ZL that satisfies condition 2. 
The third condition is satisfied when violence is sufficiently attractive for the 
opposition. This is condition 2 from proposition 2, but now we have specified the 
incumbent’s optimal levels of violence, so we can substitute those in: 
 
ZL > ((ALOpp/2) + [Ɵ + ɣ(ALOpp, ALInc)(1 – 2Ɵ)] ALInc –  
[Ɵ + ɣ(0, ALInc)(1 – 2Ɵ)] ALInc) / ((1 – 2Ɵ)(ɣ(ALOpp, ALInc) – ɣ(0, ALInc))) 
 
This condition is met when ALOpp is sufficiently low and (ɣ(ALOpp, ALInc) – ɣ(0, ALInc)) is 
high, meaning that opposition violence is inexpensive but effective. Together, these give 
us conditions under which the first three assumptions are satisfied.  
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The fourth condition is met by fixing some sufficiently high ZL. Condition 5 will 
not be violated as long as ZInc(0; 0, AHInc) is high enough. It can be arbitrarily large as 
long as (ɣ(0, ALInc) – ɣ(0, AHInc)) is close to zero. Once the first five conditions are met, 
the sixth would plausibly be met as well. The opposition has the choice between peace, 
which is met with low violence, and violence, which is met with high violence. The 
opposition’s chance of gaining power may not even be improved by using violence, and 
they use up their own resources and cause the incumbent to waste more state resources 
with a larger army. Thus, it is possible to observe the pattern that we are interested in, of 
repression in periods when a poor country receives aid and civil conflict in periods when 
it does not.  
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Employment Protection and the Labor Informality of the Youth: Evidence from India (Job 
Market Paper)  
 
Employment protection laws (EPL), are designed to promote security for workers by placing 
restrictions on firing, but they generate unintended consequences. Using India as a setting, I argue 
that EPL shifts jobs from the young to older workers. The identification strategy relies on 
heterogeneity between manufacturing sectors, and is motivated by Rajan and Zingales (1998). 
The impact of EPL is strongest in those manufacturing sectors where Indian employers would 
like to fire workers, proxied by the involuntary separation rate in the United States or Latin 
America. Finally, I present suggestive evidence that EPL reduces plant-level total factor 
productivity, and that the shift in jobs from young to old is an important channel. 
 
Profits and Economic Development (with Eric Werker, revise and resubmit at the Journal of 
Development Economics) download 
 
Are rents, or excess profits, good for development? Using industry-level manufacturing data, this 
paper demonstrates a negative effect of rents, measured by the mark-up ratio, on productivity 
growth. The negative effect is strongest in poor countries, suggesting that high profits stymie 
economic development rather than enable it. Consistent with the rent-seeking mechanism of our 
model, we find that high rents are associated with a slower reduction in tariffs. A country's 
average mark-up in manufacturing is a strong negative predictor of future economic growth, 
indicating that we may be measuring a phenomenon of the broader business environment. 
 
The Political Transfer Problem (with Faisal Z. Ahmed and Eric Werker) 
 
Aid from oil-rich autocrats created unearned rents for many developing countries in the 1970s, 
which transformed their trajectories of governance. While some recipients of these funds 
eventually democratized as part of the “Third Wave," many languished in autocracy. Building on 
recent theoretical formulations on fragile states, we develop a model to account for these 
dynamics. We formally demonstrate that autocrats experiencing a windfall in unearned income 
may find it optimal to donate to other countries some of the windfall in order to make the state a 
less attractive prize to potential insurgents (and in the process further their geopolitical interests). 
The effect on the recipient varies with the level of rents, where high levels of rents generate 
repression, and low levels can lead to conflict or democratization. We develop case studies of the 
Middle East, Latin America, and Eastern Europe, and argue that the boom in oil prices from 
1973-85 produced long-run political dynamics that are consistent with the model. 
 
 
 
